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From the surge of recent litigation it appears that the civil rights movement
has at last discovered another oppressed minority1-those persons encompassed
within the rather unhappy label of "mentally retarded."2 The purpose of this
article is to focus upon three areas affecting the civil rights of the mentally re-
tarded: guardianship, institutionalization, and education. These areas were
chosen because they are both critical and topical.' They also raise a rather dis-
quieting question about our traditional notion, solidly engrained in the law, that
the parent is the proper advocate for the child.
Before investigating the aforementioned areas, I would like to engage in a
brief critique of the title of this article. By so doing, I may be able to provide a
better perspective for the reader. The title contains two troublesome phrases:
"civil rights" and "mentally retarded." There is no question but that the term
* Associate Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School. Professor Murdock is also a
member of the Board of Directors of The National Center for Law and the Handicapped, Inc.
1 The size of this minority group is surprisingly large:
It is estimated that there are 6.1 million people in the United States (3% of
the population) who should be identified as mentally retarded before they are 15
years old. Between 100,000 to 200,000 of the babies born each year are likely to
join this group. By 1980, natural population growth is expected to increase the
total to 6.8 million, unless far-reaching preventive measures can be introduced.
Of the total about 2.4 million are children and youth under 21 years of age. At
least 2.1 million of these children are mildly retarded and many of them may not be
singled out and identified until they have been in school for several years. Another
144,000 or more are estimated to fall in the moderately retarded category, with an
additional 120,000 in the severe and profound categories.
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR RETARDED CHILDREN, FACTS ON MENTAL RETARDATION 5 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as FACTS ON MENTAL RETARDATION]. See also, Haggerty, Kane, & Udall,
An Essay on the Legal Rights of the Mentally Retarded, 6 FAs. L. Q. 59, 62 (1972).
2 I have used the adjective "unhappy" in connection with the label "mentally retarded"
not only because, for most people, the condition of being mentally retarded is considered an
unhappy one but also because of the problems in defining what is meant by mental retarda-
tion. "In the light of the history of controversy about the nature of intelligence, its organi-
zation, its predictability, and its susceptibility to change, it is not surprising that no single
definition of subnormality has ever been satisfactory to all concernecL" H. ROBINSON & N.
ROBINSON, THE MENTALLY RETARDED CmaD--A PSYCHOLOGICAL APPROACH 27 (1965)
[hereinafter cited as ROBINSON]. The American Association on Mental Deficiency has promul-
gated the following definition: "Mental Retardation refers to subaverage general intellectual
functioning which originates during the developmental period and is associated with impair-
ment in adaptive behavior." Id. at 33-34. Not only is there a problem in defining mental
retardation, but there is a further problem in distinguishing among the various levels of retarda-
tion. See note 6 infra. See also BAUMEISTER, MENTAL RETARDATIoN-APPRAISAL, EDUCATION
AND REHABILITATION 1-19 (1967). This book is an informative collection of original papers
by specialists in psychology, medicine, special education, and speech and hearing therapy.
3 As to the critical nature of these areas, see text accompanying notes 11, 42, and 126,
infra. As to the topical aspect of retardation, particularly the aforementioned three areas, note
that since the first of this year, TIME magazine has twice focused upon retardation in its section
on medicine. TrME, Feb. 14, 1972, at 68-69; id., May 8, 1972, at 51-56. See also U.S. NEws"
& WORLD REPORT, Sept. 18, 1972, at 58-62; New York Times, Oct. 9, 1971, at col. 4; id.,
Mar. 26, 1972, at 35, col. 2, and BEHAVIOR TODAY, Mar. 20, 1972, at 1: "Flood of litigation
to change status quo in mental hospitals and schools for retarded amounts to across-the-board
campaign for civil rights of mentally handicapped."
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"civil rights" is now an "in" term to the professionals in the mental retardation
field and the litigators in the current court cases who have adopted the term
just as enthusiastically as the leaders of the black community did some two
decades ago.' However, it could be argued that there is a substantial difference
between the two situations. The black was simply asking for what the white man
then enjoyed. On the other hand, the retardate, because of his disability, may
appear to the outsider to be making an extraordinary demand upon government
rather than asking for that which is generally available to a person as an ordinary
incident of citizenship. Thus, the question arises as to whether the concept of
civil rights' is sufficiently broad to cover the rights for which the advocates of
the retarded are contending. This question will be analyzed further in the
balance of this article.
Equally troublesome-if not more so-is the use of the term "mentally
retarded," since such use connotes the impression that we are talking about a
homogeneous group, which is simply not the case.0 That the retarded are,
4 See, e.g., BEHAVIOR TODAY, note 3 supra.
5 As Justice Warren has stated in his Civil Rights Lectures reprinted herein:
The rights protected by the Bill of Rights are old and honored ones which have
come down to us as the product of Anglo-Saxon civilization in which we have our
roots. Freedom of religion, of expression, of association, participation in government,
the privacy of the home, freedom from self-incrimination, and the right to civilized
procedures before, during and after civil and criminal trials, are basic to our way of
life, and with other guaranteed rights are called either civil rights or civil liberties.
Warren, Notre Dame Law School Civil Rights Lectures, 48 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 14 '(1972).
However, the term "civil rights" also includes, for example, those arising under the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment which requires states to treat their citizens
equally. When states instead act in a discriminatory fashion, the retarded have a sound claim
that their civil rights have been abridged. See text accompanying and following note 100 infra.
6 Within the general concept of retardation there are subdivisions reflecting the degree of
impairment:
Degrees of mental retardation are measured by considering both "measured
intelligence" and "impairment in adaptive behavior." For descriptive convenience
the range of mental retardation has been divided into four levels-mild, moderate,
severe, and profound. Children who are classified as mildly retarded (frequently
called "educable mentally retarded" by educators), although limited in their poten-
tials for advanced academic achievement, can usually be brought by special educa-
tional techniques to a state of self-sufficiency as adults. Moderately retarded children
show a rate of mental development which is less than half of that normally expected,
but can nevertheless learn to take care of their personal needs and perform many
useful tasks in the home or in a sheltered working situation. The severely retarded
can learn self-care, but their potential economic productivity is limited.
The profoundly retarded also respond to training in basic self-care, and they
additionally profit from special training in such areas as behavior control, self-pro-
tection, language development, and physical mobility.
FACTS ON MENTAL RETARDATION, supra note 1, at 4.
In order to place these categories in better perspective, the following table from BAU-
MEISTER, supra note 2, at 10, may be helpful:
W d pCorresponding IQWord description range for
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CIVIL RIGHTS OF THE MENTALLY RETARDED
contrariwise, a rather heterogeneous group can best be demonstrated by the
following examples.
Consider first the situation of a mildly retarded ghetto child from a minority
group (particularly a minority group with a language barrier, such as the
Chicanos or Puerto Ricans), who is living at home and whose retardation may
be environmental rather than biological, as compared to a non-ambulatory,
biologically profoundly retarded child who is institutionalized. This contrast
is as sharp as the difference between night and day. In the case of the ghetto
child, his prospects for living a "normalized" life are quite good; in fact, his
advocates may be contending that he is not retarded at all, but rather that the
testing procedures which have so labeled him are deficient.' In the case of the
The following table, which appears in FACTS ON MENTAL RETARDATION, supra note 1, at
15, may give some idea as to the dispersion of the various degrees of retardation and the in-
cidence thereof in the general population:
ESTIMATES OF RETARDATION BY AGE AND DEGRE-1970
1970 Census All Ages Under 21 Yrs.
21 Yrs. and above
General Population 203.2 million 80.5 million 122.7 million
3% General Population 6.1 million 2.4 million 3.7 million
Retarded
Profound (IQ 0-20) 92 thousand 36 thousand 56 thousand
About 1',%
Severe (IQ 20-35) 214 thousand 84 thousand 130 thousand
About 31/2%
Moderate (IQ 36-52) 366 thousand 144 thousand 222 thousand
About 6%
Mild (IQ 53+) 5.4 million + 2.1 million + 3.3 million +
About 89%
The term "educable" is often used coextensively with the term "mildly retarded" and the
term "trainable" is often used coextensively with the term 'moderately retarded." If nothing
else, the controversy over definitions has developed terminology more palatable than that which
formerly existed. "For many years, the terms idiot, imbecile, and moron were used in
United States to denote abilities roughly in the I.Q. ranges 0 to 30, 30 to 50, and 50 to 70,
respectively." ROBINSON, supra note 2, at 49. See also IND. STAT. ANN. § 8-101(c) (2) (1964),
where an incompetent is defined as a person who is incapable by reason of "... imbecility [or)
idiocy... of either managing his property or caring for himself or both."
Also, illustrative of the "loose" language used in some statutes to denote mentally retarded
patients are the following statutes:
The purpose of this institution shall be to care for, support, train and instruct
feeble-minded children, the term feeble-minded to include idiotic, epileptic and
paralytic children.
Trustees shall make special provisions that low-grade inmates shall not associate
with the better more improved grades, and epileptics shall be kept separate from all
other grades as much as possible.
Id. §§ 22-1703, 22-1725.
7 A class action suit was filed in the United States District Court for the Northern District
of California, Larry P. v. Riles, Civil No. C-71-2270 (N.D. Cal., filed Nov. 22, 1971), in which
six black elementary aged children who have been placed in special education classes for the
mentally retarded contend that they are "the victims of a testing procedure which fails to
recognize their unfamiliarity with the white middle class cultural background and which ig-
nores the learning experiences which they may have had in their homes." The defendants
include state and local school officials and board members. See also Ross, DeYoung & Cohen,
Confrontation: Special Education Placement and the Law, 38 EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN 5
(Sept. 1971); South Bend Tribune, Apr. 24, 1972, at 24, col. 7 (where it was reported that
the board of directors of the local ACTION, ING. had adopted a resolution embodying recom-




institutionalized child, however, his mode of living in many instances would defy
characterization as human.8 Obviously the rights for which each child contends
will differ markedly.
As a second example, consider the situation in a state in which the "edu-
cable"9 retarded are in the public schools, the "trainable"-depending upon the
extent to which the county in which they reside avails itself of a local tax levy
for a mental retardation center'°-have poor or adequate programs, and the
"severely and profoundly" retarded have little or nothing in the way of programs.
Here, the retarded as a group have little in common; the educable may be
quite content with their situation, whereas the severely and profoundly retarded
have nothing to lose by challenging the status quo. It may well be that if litigation
were to ensue, the retarded simply would not present a unified front.
II. Guardianship
The problem of guardianship will be examined first because it illustrates
the potential conflict of interest which may exist between parent and retarded
child-and such conflict may vitiate the "consent" or "voluntariness" which is a
relevant and perhaps a critical factor when dealing with the area of institutional-
ization."
In analyzing the guardianship topic the following question must be con-
sidered: Should the law presume that the parent has both the motivation and
the capability to represent the best interests of the retardate whenever matters
affecting his welfare come in question or is there the need to develop some special
8 See text and footnotes commencing at note 45 infra.
9 See note 6 supra for a discussion of the degrees of retardation.
10 See, e.g., IND. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-3015, 22-3014 (1964) which provide:
22-3015. As used in this act the terms "community mental health center" and
"community mental retardation center" shall mean a program of services approved
by the department of mental health and organized for the purpose of providing
multiple services for the mentally disordered and operated by one of the following
or combinations thereof.
1. Any city, town, county or other political subdivision of this state; any agency
of the state of Indiana or of the United States; and any political subdivision of
another state; including but not limited to and without limiting the generality of the
foregoing, hospitals owned or operated by units of government and building authori-
ties organized for the purpose of constructing facilities to be leased to units of
government;
2. A corporation incorporated under the provisions of the "Indiana General Not
for Profit Corporation Act";
3. A nonprofit corporation incorporated in another state; and
4. A university or college.
22-3014. The board of county commissioners for a county may authorize the
furnishing of financial assistance ,to any community mental health center or any
community mental retardation center located, or which may hereafter be located, in
the county for the purpose of constructing and/or operating the center. The county
council of the county, upon request of the board of county commissioners, may
appropriate annually, from the general fund of the county, funds to provide financial
assistance for construction and/or operation of the center in an amount of not to
exceed the amount which could be collected from the annual levy up to a ten cent
(10 cent) tax on each one hundred dollars ($100) of taxable property within the
county.
11 See text following note 78 infra.
[October, 19721
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form of advocacy to insure that the rights of the retarded are adequately safe-
guarded and implemented?"2
Our natural reticence in facing such a suggestion stems from the fact that
deeply rooted in our legal 3 and sociological 4 heritage is the position that parents
are the natural guardians of their children. Implicit in such a position is the belief
that there is an identity or, at least, compatibility of interest between the parent
and the child as well as a capability on the part of the parent to care for and
deal with the child and represent him in his dealings with society's institutions.
However, the time may have come to challenge this fundamental assumption.
12 As is stated in THE PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON MENTAL RETAnDATION, MR 70-THE
DEcIsrvE DECADE 22 (1970) [hereinafter cited as THE DECIsvE DECADE]:
The President's Committee is working to develop model guardianship provisions
that will encourage the retarded individual to exercise all the citizen rights that he is
capable of exercising, give him the benefit of equal protection under the law with all
other citizens, and promote the development in states of public advocates for the
retarded (and other handicapped) who will serve both as counselors and as sur-
rogates as necessary.
The above titled book is the 1970 annual report of The President's Committee on Mental
Retardation. Each year the Committee prepares and publishes such a report. The nature of
the President's Committee on Mental Retardation is explained in FACTS ON MENTAL RETARDA-
TION, supra note 1, at 15, where it is stated:
The Presidentes Committee on Mental Retardation was appointed in May, 1966.
The Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare is chairman; members are the
Secretary of Labor, the Director of the Office of Economic Opportunity and 21 dis-
tinguished men and women.
The Committee evaluates Federal mental retardation programs; coordinates the
activities of Federal agencies in the mental retardation fields; provides liaison between
Federal activities and related activities of state and local governments, foundations,
and other private organizations; disseminates information to the general public to
reduce the incidence of mental retardation and ameliorate its effects.
For more information write directly to The President's Committee on Mental Retardation,
Washington, D.C. 20201.
13 As an illustration of the legal position with respect to guardianship, IND. STAT. ANN. §
8-105 (1964) is representative in its approach. This section provides:
Except as otherwise determined in a divorce proceeding or in some other proceed-
ing authorized by law, the father and the mother jointly, if living and competent, or
the survivor shall be the natural guardians of their minor children unless such child
is married.
See also H. CLARK, LANv OF DomESTic RELATIONS § 8.4, at 245 (1968); KATZ, WHEN
PARENTS FArL-THE LAW's RESPONSE TO FAMILY BREAKDOWN (1971); Caruso v. Superior
Court, 2 Ariz. App. 134, 406 P.2d 852 (1965), reu'd, 100 Ariz. 167, 412 P.2d 463 (1966).
14 The sociological position is well stated in W. Wolfensberger & H. Zauha, Citizen
Advocacy and Protective Services 1 (unpublished manuscript in the Notre Dame Law School
Library) :
In their relationship with each other or their children, spouses can be said to
exercise both "instrumental" and "expressive?' functions (Parsons & Bales, 1955).
Instrumental functions are those which solve the practical problems of everyday life,
such as earning a living, mowing the lawn, washing the dishes, and bathing the
children. Expressive functions involve the exchange of affection that meet deep-seated
needs and that often make instrumental demands meaningful or bearable.
Generally, in our society a child has one or two parents who provide for his
physicaland emotional needs, who socialize him into the larger culture, and who
vigorously represent his interests. As time passes and as the child grows up, -the
parental role becomes less instrumental, but it retains its expressive nature for life.
In other words, as long as parents live, they remain a source of emotional ties and
support to their children, even though the parental functions become less and less
problem-solving and task-oriented.
The expressive function of parenthood implies a deep emotional commitment.
Ordinarily, this commitment to the person of the child lasts through life and persists
even when the parent disapproves of the young (or grown) child's behavior. In-
deed, this commitment is usually firmer and more stable than that of marriage; it
can scarcely be called a rational one-but then, society does not expect it to be. To
the contrary, most people would agree that it is desirable that every person have at
[Vol 48:133]
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The fact that our guardianship laws presently in operation are not effectively
dealing with the needs of the retarded has been pointed out by the President's
Committee on Mental Retardation:
Most states' provisions for guardianship of the retarded are relics of a time
when the mentally retarded individual was considered an incompetent who
had to be kept away from normal social and work contacts. They largely
consider or assume the retarded person to be without rights, deny him due
process or the equal protection of the laws, and often encumber his family's
estate for years as the price of the state's assuming his care. The damage
done to retarded individuals who are capable of self-support and self-
reliance, to those who have become caught up in the judicial process, and
to families who can be in effect held responsible for a retarded individual
into a second generation is incalculable.15
Professor Richard Allen, Director of the Institute of Law, Psychiatry and Crim-
inology at George Washington University, has also chronicled deficiencies in our
present guardianship laws.16 However, the concern raised in this article transcends
least one relationship that endures beyond rationality, and that it is not terminated
by erratic or unsanctioned behavior or by misfortunes that may befall a human life.
Our society highly endorses, but does not legally demand, expressive parental
role performance. In contrast, instrumental parental role performance is, to a signifi-
cant degree, mandated by law. Thus, while parental failure to demonstrate or extend
love to a child is not punishable by law, parents are made legally responsible for their
children's support, and child neglect or abuse is punishable.
The aforesaid manuscript is to be published by The President's Committee on Mental
Retardation. Doctor Wolfensberger is currently a visiting scholar with the National Institute
on Mental Retardation, York University Campus, Toronto, Ontario, Canada.
15 THE DECISsvn DECADE, supra note 12, at 22.
16 In R. ALLEN, LEGAL RIGHTS OF THE DISABLED AND DISADVANTAGED 23 (1969) the
author has stated:
Some of the shortcomings of typical state statutes and procedures are the fol-
lowing:
1. The -terminology is imprecise; and as has been pointed out earlier, because
of inappropriate use of terms, a determination in one area may create the status of
general "incompetency";
2. Guardianship proceedings are cumbersome and expensive;
3. Both the terminology employed and the procedures required create unneces-
sary stigma for the retarded person in need of help and unnecessary pain for parents
seeking to insure that he will get it;
4. Institutionalization often creates at least a de facto if not a de jure incom-
petency;
5. Most courts do not have facilities for clinical evaluation, nor do they have
sufficient staff to oversee the discharge of fiduciary responsibility by guardians or
institutional personnel;
6. Often the alleged incompetent is not really represented by counsel, even
when the procedure requires appointment of an attorney ad litem; and the deter-
mination is frequently made ex parte;
7. There is great uncertainty as to when a guardian of the person should be
appointed, and what his duties should, be;
8. There is no established procedure for review of the competency of an insti-
tutionalized person upon his reaching his majority;
9. Guardians of the person are rarely appointed for those in residential care
institutions;
10. Guardianship is an "all or nothing" situation although in many cases partial
or limited guardianship is all that is required;
11. Few States have established a system under which a state agency can assume
some or all of the functions of a guardian when there is no one else who can fill this
role;
12. In part because of lack of community resources, and in part because of
misconstructions of existing law and regulations, in some States it is necessary to go
through a commitment proceeding to receive needed protective services.
[October, 19721
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many of the problems which the foregoing authorities raise in that it questions
whether, in many situations, the parent adequately represents the interests of his
retarded child.' Such inability may result from either a conflict of interest
between parent and child or from the disparity in sophistication between the
parent and the agency which is acting hostilely to the child.
A. The Conflict of Interest Problem
The conflict of interest facet of the guardianship problem is well illustrated
in the decision as to whether or not to institutionalize a retarded child. The
nature of this conflict has been stated in the amici brief in Wyatt v. Stickney: 8
The parent may be motivated to ask for such institutionalization for a
variety of reasons other than the best interests of the child himself, i.e., the
interests of other children in the family, mental and physical frustration,
economic stress, hostility toward the child stemming from the added pressures
of caring for him, and perceived stigma of mental retardation. The retarded
child's best interests may well lie in living with his family and in the com-
munity, but theirs may not lie in keeping him.' 9
17 This comment certainly is not meant to be a blanket criticism of parents of retarded
children. It was the refusal of parents to accept the indictment of professionals and society
that their children were hopeless that spurred many of the positive developments in the field
of mental retardation, including the organization of the National Association for Retarded
Children.
However, as the following text illustrates, there are many situations in which the parent
does not adequately represent the interest of the child. It thus becomes necessary to sort out
and identify those situations and to provide the parents with an effective advocate for the child.
The role that parents qua advocates have filled has been recognized internationally:
There are many other examples from the international scene showing parent
associations as effective change agents. In the United States, the National Associa-
tion for Retarded Children (NARC), with its research fund and distinguished
research advisory board, contributed substantially to a change in scientists' view of
this field as a legitimate and worthwhile area for scientific inquiry. From Canada,
the Ontario Association for Retarded Children mobilized international interests in
the special physical training needs of mentally retarded children and adolescents.
In Western Australia, it was the parent associations which introduced a specialized
clinic for the study of the mentally retarded in a setting since taken over by the state.
In England, the National Society for the Mentally Handicapped contributed sub-
stantially to a change in service concepts for the severely retarded by the establish-
ment of a national training center and hostel at Slough and of vacation and short-
stay homes. Finally, in a symposium held in Stockholm in 1967, the International
League of Societies for the Mentally Handicapped developed new formulations of
the individual rights of the mentally retarded which have been recognized widely as
the forerunner of a whole new conceptualization in the field of mental retardation,
underpinning the broader concept of normalization.
CHANGING PATTERNS IN RESIDENTIAL SERVICES FOR THE MENTALLY RETARDED 399-400 (B.
Kugel & W. Wolfensberger, eds. 1969) [hereinafter cited as Changing Patterns].
18 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala.), formulation of minimum standards ordered, 334 F. Supp.
1341 (M.D. Ala. 1971), implementation of standards ordered, Civil No. 3195-N (M.D. Ala.,
Apr. 13, 1972). For a discussion of the first stage of this protracted and complex litigation
see Drake, Enforcing the Right to Treatment: Wyatt v. Stickney, 10 Am. CRIm. L. REv. 587(1972); Briefs for American Psychological Association, American Orthopsychiatric Associa-
tion, American Civil Liberties Union, and American Association on Mental Deficiency as
Amicus Curiae, Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971) [hereinafter cited as
Wyatt v. Stickney, Amici Briefs]. These briefs were authored by Stanley Herr, NLADA
National Law Office, Washington, D.C.; Charles R. Halpern, Center for Law and Social
Policy, Washington, D.C.; Bruce Ennis, American Civil Liberties Union, New York; and,
James F. Fitzpatrick, Jeffrey D. Bauman, and Stephen M. Sacks, Arnold & Porter, Wash-
ington, D.C.
19 Wyatt v. Stickney Amici Briefs, supra note 18, at 34-35.
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Moreover, there are many societal pressures operating to induce parents to insti-
-tutionalize a retarded child ranging from uninformed medical opinion to the
parents' own "success" oriented expectations of their children.20 It would certainly
appear appropriate where institutionalization is in the offing to provide the
retarded child with his own advocate as a countervailing force to insure that the
alternatives to institutionalization are explored.2
Probably the most graphic illustration of the dichotomy of interest between
parent and child is found in the well publicized occurrences22 in which minor
corrective surgery has been withheld from mongoloid infants born with in-
testinal obstructions. In one such instance the child was set aside in the corner
of the hospital nursery with a sign on the crib, "nothing by mouth."2 The result,
of course, was a slow, agonizing death from dehydration. 24
20 There are physicians who refer families to these residential facilities but who have
never seen the facilities and do not know the professional personnel caring for the
clients whom they refer. This is an odd paradox since one cannot imagine a physician
referring a patient to a hospital for an operation if he knew nothing about the place
and people involved.
CHANGING PATTERNS, supra note 17, at 2-3. Another author has commented:
Comparing the results with those of earlier studies, we concluded that there is a
growing trend favoring home care of every young child, whenever possible. However,
many-including most of the obstetricians interviewed (who have perhaps least con-
tact with retarded children, but whose opinion may weigh most heavily with parents
at that traumatic time of first discovery of an apparent impairment)-still urge insti-
tutionalization of retarded children under 6, even in the face of parental objection
(especially in the case of the mongoloid child, whom they view with despairing
negativism). In fact, a majority of obstetricians said they would recommend institu-
tionalization of all infants recognized as retarded where there are other children in
the home. Only 17 percent of the pediatricians and psychiatrists and none of the
institutional physicians would agree.
R. ALLAN, supra note 16, at 13-14. In Shaw, Doctor, Do We Have a Choice?, The New York
Times Magazine, Jan. 30, 1972, at 44, the author has stated:
I know many physicians with Mongoloid children. Almost all have placed them
in institutions. Couples who are success-oriented and have high expectations for their
children are likely to institutionalize their mentally deficient offspring rather than
keep them at home. The argument that Mongoloids raised in the home perform
better than those raised in an institution is rarely persuasive with such parents.
21 Recent studies have indicated that the presence of a retarded child in the home need
not have a disruptive effect:
It is heartening to see changes in professional attitudes toward putting retarded
children into institutions. Until recently, such placement was almost universally
advised; all too frequently the advice was based on the belief that a handicapped
person always "contaminated" the family and generated great psychological burdens.
Our findings that the reactions of other family members are not inevitably deter-
mined by the nature and degree of the handicap itself cut through this mistaken belief.
It is the family's definition of the problem that most directly affects the ability of
individual members of the family to adjust -to a retarded child. The presence of a
retarded child can enhance a family's normal development, or at least not hinder it.
The recent shift away from institutions is only partly due to this realization. Other
influences are the rising costs of placement, increased awareness of the harshness of
the institutions, and growing sensitivity to the negative effects that placement and
separation have on the whole family.
Grossman, Brothers and Sisters of Retarded Children, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, April, 1972, at
82, 104; see also B. FARBER, MENTAL RETARDATION: ITS SOCIAL CONTEXT AND SOCIAL CON-
SEQUENCES (1968) '(particularly ch. 7).
22 See, e.g., Shaw, Doctor, Do We Have a Choice?, supra note 20; see also note 23 infra.
23 This situation was depicted in the film, Who Should Survive, filmed at Johns Hopkins
Hospital and produced by the Joseph P. Kennedy, Jr. Foundation for the International Sym-
posium on Human Rights in Washington, D.C.
24 Assuming arguendo that parents do have the right to forego surgery for the child (as
the following text will establish, they do not), the question may be asked why the physician
cannot take some affirmative action, such as injecting an air bubble into the child's vein, to
foreshorten the inevitable suffering. The law has always drawn an active/passive dichotomy
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It is hard to conceive of a conflict of interest more fundamental than that
just described because what is at stake is the life of the child.25 If society-
rather than labeling this failure to provide the child with ordinary care what it is,
namely, infanticide---condones this approach, a logical extension of the operative
attitudes would permit any parent of a retarded infant not to feed it, with the
same attendant ultimate consequences. This is so because the efficient cause of not
feeding the infant with the intestinal obstruction is not that the child would vomit
upon feeding---since the cause of the vomiting was readily correctible-but
rather the desire of the parents not to be burdened with a retarded child."
Most individuals would question the practical likelihood of the aforemen-
with respect to this subject. See WILLAMS, THE SANCTITY OF LIFE AND THE CRIMINAL LAW
318-326 (1957). However, the present topic illustrates that the sophistry involved in drawing
such a distinction produces a totally inhumane result. If the child is to die because it is
retarded, better it die quietly than in agony.
25 One may wonder whether the life of a retarded child is of such dignity that the
deprivation thereof can properly be described as infanticide. One author, in discussing the
tremendous cost to society which the care of the retarded entails, has stated: "While I do not
for one moment wish to place a price tag on a human life, I cannot help wondering how the
same sum spent on normal children might advance the interests of society." Neal, Some
Genetic Aspects of Therapeutic Abortion, PERsPEcTIvEs IN BIOLOGY AND MEDICINE 133, 134
(Autumn 1967). Dr. Stanley Hauerwas of Notre Dame, in an essay prepared for the Kennedy
Foundation, characterizes Dr. Neal's position as a ".. . charity run wild and gone crazy be-
cause it is unable to totally relieve the world of its suffering .... This charity no longer has
the patience to attempt to act justly in a world wracked with suffering." S. Hauerwas, The
Christian Society, and the Weak: A Meditation on the Care of the Retarded 8 (to be published
in I N.D. Magazine Oct. 1972). Dr. Hauerwas puts the moral significance of caring for the
retarded in this perspective:
The retarded are the sign that all men have significance beyond what they can be
for us--our friend, our playmate, our brother; each of us is precious and significant
because his being is grounded in God's care. The retarded, the poor, the sick, are
but particularly intense forms of God's call to every man through the other. Thus,
God calls us to regard each other as significant as we each exist for Him, as we are
each God's gift to the other.
Id.
In essence, the real question being raised here is whether, at least in part, the "problem"
of retardation can be resolved by eliminating the retarded. Abortion in many jurisdictions is
already a legally acceptable procedure for dealing with the problem. See MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 207.11(2)(a) (1961) (abortion justified if there is substantial risk of mental defect);
Annot., 28 L.Ed. 2d 1053 (1972) (validity of abortion laws from a constitutional standpoint).
With the advent of amniocentesis, abortion as a solution to the problems of retardation will
probably increase significantly. See Milunsky, Prenatal Genetic Diagnosis (pt. 3), THE NEW
ENGLAND J. MEDICINE, Dec. 31, 1970, at 1498, 1501-03. One author has suggested that
bringing a child into the world who might later experience extreme physical or emotional pain
as a result of known defects should be avoided at any costs. Lappe, The Genetic Counselor:
Responsible to Whom, HAST. CENTER RE'. No. 2, at 6-7 (Sept. 1971). Daniel Callahan has
replied to this argument, in part:
... I find it hard to see how the goal of the moral life can be reduced to the
mere "reduction in the operation of evil," i.e., suffering, without undergoing a great
deal of impoverishment in the process. The search for truth, for instance, requires a
positive (and sometimes painful) effort; and justice is a positive state of affairs, not
just the absence of suffering. The point of the moral life, I take it, lies in trying to
decide what we should seek and then seeking it, not just in finding out how to avoid
suffering.
Id. at 11. As the legal and ethical framework for dealing with the situation of the retarded
develops, it will be interesting to note whether justice or expediency becomes the touchstone.
26 One author, in discussing the decision of the parents of a mongoloid child not to have
an operation performed, has stated:
The choice they made was-no surgery. They had no intention of raising a
human being whose maximum achievement might be the ability to write his own
name. Furthermore, they did not wish to sentence their child to an institutional
existence. "If I knew the baby would be a Mongoloid," Mrs. G." said, "I would
have had an abortion."
Shaw, Doctor, Do We Have a Choice?, supra note 20, at 44, 52.
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tioned extension, that is, not feeding an otherwise normal retarded child. It is
inconceivable that a well-balanced set of parents would determine not to feed a
retarded infant. How then can assumedly equally well-balanced parents decline
surgery and permit their child to die of dehydration? While superficially the dis-
tinction lies in a medical rationale-the decision whether or not to operate-the
real distinction lies in the fact of an institutionalized setting in one instance and a
home environment in the other. In other words, as will be further developed in
this article,2" the greatest danger to the mentally retarded child lies in the insti-
tutional setting-in this case because it affords the parents the opportunity to "dis-
tance" themselves from the child and deal with the situation in an abstract
manner, namely, in the doctor's office instead of at home where the cries of the
child are a constant call to the normal parental instincts and an impetus to re-
consider the decision not to operate."s If the hospital, after the decision not to
operate is made, told the parents to take the child home, would there not, in
many instances, be an immediate reconsideration of the decision not to operate?
Notwithstanding the foregoing possibility of an administrative type resolu-
tion, how should the law operate upon this traumatic conflict of interest? In
seeking a legal resolution, there appears to be a close parallel between the mon-
goloid child's situation and the Jehovah's Witnesses cases in which courts have
ordered blood transfusions over parental objection predicated upon religious
beliefs.2" Jurisdiction of the court may be based upon either the so-called
"neglected child" statutes"0 or, relying on the doctrine of parens patriae, the gen-
eral equity powers."1 A liberal interpretation of the so-called "child abuse"
27 See text following note 42 infra.
28 As one of the doctors who has been involved in this dilemma has stated:
As a surgeon whose natural inclination is to use the scalpel to fight off death,
standing by and watching a salvageable baby die is the most emotionally exhausting
experience I know. It is easy at a conference, in a theoretical discussion, to decide
that such infants should be allowed to die. It is altogether different to stand by in
the nursery and watch as dehydration and infection wither a tiny being over hours
and days. This is a terrible ordeal for me and the hospital staff-much more so than
for the parents who never set foot in the nursery.
Shaw, Doctor, Do We Have a Choice?, supra note 20, at 53.
29 E.g., Hoener v. Bertinato, 67 N.J. Super. 517, 171 A.2d 140 (1961); State v. Perricone,
37 N.J. 463, 181 A.2d 751 (1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 890 (1962); Annot., 30 A.L.R.2d 1138
(1953). See also Gloitman v. Cosgrove 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689, 693 (1967), where the
court rejected a cause of action against a doctor for falling to apprise the parents during
pregnancy of the substantial risk of a defective child in order that they might procure an
abortion. The court adhered to the position that the unborn child's right to life was of greater
importance than the interest of the parents in being free from emotional and financial injury:
It is basic to the human condition to seek life and hold onto it however heavily
burdened. If Jeffrey could have been asked as to whether his life should be snuffed
out before his full term of gestation could run its course, our felt intuition of human
nature tells us he would almost surely choose life with defects as against no life at all.
"For the living there is hope, but for the dead there is none." Theocritus.
30 See generally CLARK, supra note 13, § 17.3 at 581-82; id. § 18.5 at 629-36; KATZ,
supra note 13. For an example of specific statutory provisions see IND. STAT. ANN. §§ 9-3201
et seq. (1956) (particularly § 9-3206, where a neglected child is defined in part as one who is
"in an environment dangerous to life, limb, or injurious to the health or morals of himself or
others"); id. §§ 52-504, 52-505 (1964) (which authorizes a court to transfer custody of a
neglected child to the public welfare department). See Young, The Problem of Neglect-The
Legal Aspects, 4 J. FAM. L. 29 (1964).
31 The power to protect children and act for their welfare was acknowledged to be
part of equity jurisdiction in England at least as far back as the Seventeenth Cen-
tury, although the origin of the jurisdiction remains in dispute. It is usually explained
as being derived from the Crown's prerogative as parens patriae to protect those of
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statutes12 might even impose upon the hospital the duty to notify the appropriate
authorities so that legal action may be commenced. With this line of precedent, it
can hardly be said that "nothing can be done? if the parents do not act, a plaint
uttered by some medical personnel.
B. Inability to Deal Effectively with Institutional Society
The other facet of parental inability to represent adequately the best interests
of the retarded child lies in the inability of many well-intentioned parents to deal
effectively with the public and private institutional providers of service. For
example, the parent of a child in a special education class within the public school
system is likely to hesitate to question the quality of the program since the threat
of exclusion weighs heavily in the parents' minds. The parent is realistically
aware that the cost of a private program is prohibitive and that the public
program is better than that which the parent could provide at home. Similarly,
a parent of a child who has been voluntarily admitted to a state institution would
hesitate to challenge the quality of the care provided because the child is con-
stantly subject to the threat of subtle-and not so subtle-retaliation.3 Addition-
the Crown's subjects who are unable to protect themselves . . . The jurisdiction has
likewise been recognized from the earliest times in the United States, and ifs now
largely covered by local statutes.
Cr.An, supra note 13, at § 17.1.
32 A typical statute provides as follows:
The declared purpose of this act ... is to provide for the protection of children
who have had physical injury inflicted upon them and who are further threatened by
the conduct of those responsible for their care and protection. Physicians, interns,
residents, laboratory technicians, nurses, pharmacists, chiropractors or other persons
furnishing medical aid becoming aware of such cases should report them to the County
Department of Public Welfare or the law enforcement agency having jurisdiction
thereby invoking the protective services of the state in an effort to protect the health
and welfare of these children and to prevent further abuses.
Acts of 1965, ch. 268, § 1, Ind. Laws (repealed 1971) language incorporated Ind. Ann. Stat.
§ 52-1427 (Burns Cum. Supp. 1972). See also Annot., 12 A.L.R.2d 1047 (1950).
33 One opportunity for the use of the not so subtle from of retaliation is what is euphe-
mistically referred to as 'therapeutic isolation." Therapeutic isolation operates in the following
fashion:
Many dormitories for the severely and moderately retarded ambulatory residents
have solitary confinement cells or, what is officially referred to and is jokingly called
by many attendants, "therapeutic isolation." "Therapeutic isolation" means solitary
confinement-in its most punitive and inhumane form. These cells are usually located
on an upper floor, off to the side and away from the casual or official visitor's
scrutiny. . . . Isolation cells are generally tiny rooms, approximately 7 feet by 7 feet,
shielded from the outside with a very heavy metal door having either a fine strong
screen or metal bars for observation of the "prisoner." Some cells have mattresses,
others blankets, still others bare floors. None that I had seen (and I found these
cells in each institution visited) had either a bed, a wash stand, or a toilet. What I
did find in one cell was a 13- or 14-year-old boy, nude, in a corner of a starkly bare
room lying on his own urine and feces. The boy had been in solitary confinement for
several days for committing an institutional infraction, as I recall, directing abusive
language to an attendant. Another child, in another institution, had been in solitary
confinement for approximately 5 days for breaking windows. Another had been in
isolation, through a long holiday weekend, because he had struck an attendant. Ironi-
cally, in the dormitory where this boy was being incarcerated, I saw another young
man who had been "sent to bed early" because he had bitten off the ear of a patient
several hours previously. Apparently, it is infinitely more serious to strike an attendant
(and it should not be misunderstood that I condone this) than to bite off the ear of
another resident.
CHANGING PATTERNS, supra note 20, at 41-42.
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ally, the parent may feel that if he disturbs the status quo, the child may be thrust
back upon him. Moreover, the parent is likely to be unaware of the professional
standards which the institution must meet and the political and quasi-political
pressures which can be brought to bear upon the institution. Finally, he probably
does not have the financial resources to effectively challenge the institution, either
in a legal forum or otherwise."4
How then may the question as to the need for a new form of advocacy for
the retarded be answered? First, except in extraordinary situations, there is no
need to oust the parent as guardian of the child. However, there is a critical need
for the development of supplementary and complementary advocacy models-
both from a legal advocacy"5 and a lay or citizen advocacy standpoint." Further-
more, whenever institutionalization is involved-and here "institutionalization"
should be broadly defined so as to encompass within its ambit both the situation
34 The sheer extent, size, and monetary value and the economic utility to certain
communities, of the current physical plants, facilities, and services for the mentally
retarded tend to block or delay action toward change. On the one hand, the object-
ing vested interests are very strong, and on the other, changes, in order to be effec-
tive, have to be of a radical, almost revolutionary rather than evolutionary, nature.
Id. at 391-92.
35 Legal advocacy models are already developing. The favorable results in Wyatt u.
Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala.), formulation of minimum standards ordered, 334 F.
Supp. 1341 (M.D. Ala. 1971), implementation of standards ordered, Civil No. 3195-N (M.D.
Ala., Apr. 13, 1972), are in large part attributable to the consortium of amici, composed of
public interest law firms and public spirited lawyers who entered the litigation, together with
the civil rights attorneys from the Justice Department which has recently established a new
division to deal with institutions. The amici have now taken steps to form a National Council
on the Rights of the Mentally Impaired, to continue litigation to protect the mentally impaired,
particularly those involuntarily confined to public institutions. Notre Dame Law School, in
conjunction with the National Association for Retarded Children, The Council for The Re-
tarded of St. Joseph County, and the American Bar Association, has formed a National Center
for Law and the Handicapped, one whose missions will be to provide advocacy services for the
mentally retarded. See also Kay, Legal Planning for the Mentally Retarded: The California
Experience, 60 CALF. L. REv. 438 (1972).
36 The need and importance of community volunteers is described as follows:
A vital factor on the American social scene is the volunteer, and in this particu-
lar context, the volunteer who as an interested citizen activist gives freely of his time
to participate vigorously in organizing, guiding, and critically reviewing and apprais-
ing human welfare services in his community, his state, and his country. As an inde-
pendent citizen without vested interests in the subject matter, he is often an ideal
person to call to public attention disturbing developments which require change, such
as the existence of dehumanizing, unworthy, or inadequate services to other human
beings. To the degree that it requires controversy to accomplish this, he can and
should create such controversy. To the degree that sustained publicity is required to
elicit public concurrence, he is in a position to develop it. In the role of ombudsman,
adopted from the Scandinavian model, he can introduce a new pattern of safeguard-
Ing the rights of the mentally retarded, of their parents, and also of those who work
with the retarded. Citizen volunteers can perform an invaluable service by gaining
the support of individuals or groups in the community who for various reasons are
opposed to the initiation and maintenance of services and facilities on behalf of the
mentally retarded. Without the help of volunteers, change may be long delayed; with
their active participation, change may be considerably accelerated.
It is of vital importance that there be always consumer groups and citizen
activists who retain their freedom to criticize the established agencies and policies.
Thus, such consumers and activities should be careful not to be maneuvered into situa-
tions of financial or other dependency upon the agencies they should survey. How-
ever, agencies such as institutions, state departments concerned with institutions,
and other service systems could increase their orientation to change by employing
some intelligent, alert consumers as well as attorneys as staff members in order to
actively seek out ways of safeguarding the rights and welfare of the clients, investigate
complaints, and communicate with citizen and consumer groups.
If, in this fashion, citizen volunteers, consumer groups, professional organizations,
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of the hospitalized mongoloid infant with the intestinal obstruction and the place-
ment of a retarded child within special education classes of the public school
system-it would appear desirable, if not absolutely necessary, to provide the
services of a concerned, yet uninvolved (in the sense of personally intimidated by
the situation) third party, 7 whether it be a guardian ad litem (ad institution-
alem) approach or the citizen advocacy approach espoused by Dr. Wolf Wolfens-
berger5 5
and government collaborate as equal partners on the local, state, and national level,
they will constitute a powerful force for change and for accomplishing a vital social
task.
CHANGING PATTERNS, supra, note 20, at 401.
With respect to the concept of ombudsman see Cheng, The Ombudsman or Citizens De-
fender: A Modern Institution, THE ANNALS, May, 1968, at 20; note 38 infra.
37 It almost goes without saying that the advocate for the retarded should not be the
institution in which he is confined or anyone subject to its influence. An obvious conflict of in-
terest exists. Yet, many statutes provide that, for example, the superintendent of an institution
in which the individual is confined may be appointed as guardian of the ward's estate. E.g.,
IND. STAT. ANN. § 22-1256 (1964). While the foregoing statute relates only to the estate of the
ward, this is not because it is contemplated that someone else will be appointed as guardian of
the person, but rather no guardian of the person is contemplated. In other words, our guardian-
ship laws are more concerned about the estate than the person of the incompetent. The burden
caused by the conflict of interest which inheres in any institution, or an employee of such in-
stitution, when designated as guardian falls upon the client:
When a professional person provides protective services as part of his agency-
defined duties, it is almost inevitable that he will experience conflicts of interest or of
loyalty. By the very way in which our system works, the interests of the client must
be expected occasionally to be at variance with the interests of the agency. This
places the professional in the middle, and human nature and our system being what
they are, professionals more commonly internalize the interests of the agency than of
the client. In contrast to the agency which has many voices and much power, a
retarded person's voice and power, for instance, are zero unless someone else speaks for
him. Professionals whose career interests, reward systems, and social system ties lie
within agencies-as is commonly the case---cannot be expected to provide impaired
persons with the loud, loyal, consistent, unwavering voice they need.
Wolfensberger & Zauha, supra note 14 at 5.
38 The foremost "advocate" of citizen advocacy is Dr. Wolfensberger. He has defined citizen
advocacy thus:
[A] mature, competent citizen volunteer representing, as if they were his own, the
interests of another citizen who is impaired in his instrumental competency, or who
has major expressive needs which are unmet and which are likely to remain unmet
without special intervention.
Viewing the interests and welfare of the impaired person as if they were his own,
the mission of the advocate is to use culturally appropriate means to fulfill the instru-
mental and expressive needs of such a person, consistent with cultural norms and
with the person's impairments and potentials. For lack of a better term, and espe-
cially to avoid use of the term "ward," I shall refer to the impaired person in an
advocacy relationship as a "protege."
In order to represent someone's interests as one's own, one must pursue a strategy
which minimizes potential conflicts of interest. Thus, the advocacy concept demands
that advocacy for an impaired person is to be exercised not by agencies, and not by
professionals acting in professional roles, but by competent and suitable citizens. To
underline these emphases, one can quote as an example from Article V of the Declara-
tion of General and Specific Rights of the Mentally Retarded adopted in October of
1968 by the International League of Societies for the Mentally Handicapped: "No
person rendering direct services to the mentally retarded should also serve as his
guardian." (ILSMH, 1969).
Conceivably, advocates can function singly or in groups, and represent the inter-
ests of both individual persons as well as groups of persons. However, the heart of
the proposed advocacy scheme is individual advocacy, in which one citizen is the advo-
cate for one other citizen. It is primarily with this type of advocacy that this treatise
will concern itself.
Wolfensberger & Zauha, supra note 14 at 6. Doctor Wolfensberger has been instrumental in
adopting the Citizen Advocacy Approach in the State of Nebraska. These programs have been
described in the August 1970 issues of THE ROTARIAN and the REAia's DrGEsT.
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The need for special advocacy is greatest in the institutional setting. Ex-
perience has demonstrated that the gravest threats to the welfare and even the
life of the child exist in such a setting. 9 Also, because of the distancing" in-
volved in such a setting, the parent can easily delude himself that "things really
aren't that bad" and can absolve himself from further responsibility when the
child is entrusted to the institution. Finally, because of the disparity in leverage
and sophistication that normally exists between parent and institution, the parent,
in many cases, is simply not capable of effectively dealing with the institution."
III. Institutionalization
This, then, leads to the further question as to the rights to which an insti-
tutionalized retarded child is entitled. While there are many rights, including
the right to visitation by family members at all reasonable hours,4 2 the right to be
compensated for their labors,4" and the right to normal relationships with the
opposite sex,44 for which advocates of the retarded might contend, probably the
two most critical are the right to a humane physical and psychological environ-
ment and the right to adequate treatment. The question to be hereinafter con-
39 See text accompanying and following note 45 infra.
40 See text at note 28 supra for an illustration of distancing.
41 See text following note 32 supra. See also Cheng, The Ombudsman or Citizens Defender:
A Modern Institution, supra note 36, at 30 for a discussion of the complexity of governmental
administration and the attendant need for some sort of ombudsman scheme: "[Faced with a
huge and complex body of governmental instrumentalities, an aggrieved citizen may not even
know where or to whom to complain."
42 Statutes often provide for a right of family visitation during all reasonable periods. Cf.
Ind. Ann. Stat. § 22-1034 (1964). However, institutions often try to discourage family visita-
tion, in large part because of the deplorable conditions, particularly in the so-called "back
wards." See text and footnotes following note 45 infra. Visitation is also indirectly curtailed
by locating a child in an institution which is at a great distance from the family home. A good
critique of visitation procedures in the mental illness area is found in S. BRAKEL & R. Rocx,
THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 158 (rev. ed. 1971).
43 Townsend v. Treadway, Comm'r, Tenn. Dep't of Mental Health, Civil No. 6500 (M.D.
Tenn., filed Feb. 16, 1972) (alleging that the inhabitants of the institution were required to
perform labor and services without adequate compensation, thereby giving rise to a constitu-
tional cause of action predicated upon involuntary servitude); but see Employees of Dep't of
P.H. & W. v. Dep't of P.H. & W., 452 F.2d 820 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. granted, 405 U.S. 1016
(1972) (where the court held that, notwithstanding the Fair Labor Standards Act, employees
of the state could not sue the state).
44 In effect, what the advocates of the retarded are moving toward is the adoption of
what is known as the "normalization principle." This principle will be relevant in connection
with the discussion of the "least restrictive alternative," see text accompanying note 61 infra,
and in dealing with the high cost, both in terms of dollars and wasted life, in connection with
institutional care. See text at note 110 infra. An excellent discussion of the normalization
principle is found in CHANGING PATTERNS, supra note 20, at 179-196. The author defines
the principle as follows:
Thus, as I see it, the normalization principle means making available to the
mentally retarded patterns and conditions of everyday life which are as close as
possible to the norms and patterns of the main stream of society.
This principle should be applied to all the retarded, regardless whether mildly
or profoundly retarded, or whether living in the homes of their parents or in group
homes with other retarded. The principle is useful in every society, with all age
groups, and adaptable to social changes and individual developments. Consequently,
it should serve as a guide for medical, educational, psychological, social, and political
work in this field, and decisions and actions made according to the principle should
turn out more often right than wrong.
Id. at 181. Effective implementation of this principle has already been accomplished in the
Scandinavian countries.
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sidered is whether such "rights" are legally cognizable. While it is proper
for the advocates of the retarded to speak of rights, such semantics are not mean-
ingful until the posited rights are secured by legislative or judicial recognition.
Litigation, which may ultimately provide the answer, is presently in progress in
several jurisdictions.
A. Present Abuses
Before examining the legal precedents and course of the present litigation,
it would be wise to explore the factual situation giving rise to the need to seek
judicial recognition of constitutional standards with respect to the care of the
retarded in an institutional setting. Reference has already been made to the
articles in the news media4 5 referring to the "warehousing" of retardates in
institutions. Comparable situations also have been substantiated by professional
investigations.
In 1948, Albert Deutsch, in reporting upon the conditions at the Phila-
delphia State Hospital for Mental Diseases, stated:
... I entered buildings swarming with naked humans herded like cattle and
treated with less concern, pervaded by a fetid odor so heavy, so nauseating,
that the stench seemed to have almost a physical existence of its own. I
saw hundreds of patients living under leaking roofs, surrounded by moldy,
decaying walls, and sprawling on rotting floors for want of seats or benches
.... Many of the attendants, I was told, were vagrants recruited directly
from courts and police stations where they were reportedly given the choice
of a jail sentence or going on the Byberry payroll ....
Later, in 1965, Dr. Burton Blatt, Chairman of the Special Education Department
of Boston University, and Fred Kaplan, a photographer, gained access to a
number of institutions for the mentally retarded in order to produce a photo-
graphic essay on institutional conditions. Their study confirmed that the con-
ditions described above continued to exist:
In each of the dormitories for severely retarded residents there is what is
euphemistically called a day room or recreation room. The odor in each of
these rooms is over-powering. After a visit to a day room we had to send
our clothes to the dry cleaners to have the stench removed. The facilities
often contribute to the horror. Floors are sometimes wooden and excretions
are rubbed into the cracks, leaving permanent stench. Most day rooms have
a series of bleacher benches on which sit unclad residents jammed together
without purposeful activity, communication, or any interaction. In each
day room is an attendant or two, whose main function seems to be to "stand
around" and, on occasion, hose down the floor "driving" excretions into a
sewer conveniently located in the center of the room....
... .The question one might ask is, Is it possible to prevent these
conditions? Although we are convinced that to teach severely retarded
adults to wear clothes one must invest time and patience, we believe it
possible to do so-given adequate staff. There is one more requirement.
45 See note 3 supra.
46 DEUTSCH, THE SHAME OF THE STATES 42-43 (1948).
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The staff has to be convinced that residents can be taught to wear clothes,
that they can be engaged in purposeful activities, that they can learn to
control their bladders. The staff has to believe that their "boys" and "girls"
are human beings who can learn. Obviously, the money and the additional
staff are vitally important. However, even more important, is the funda-
mental belief that each of these residents is a human being.47
More recently, in Massachusetts, the March, 1971, report of the Joint
Special Commission on Belchertown State School and Monson State Hospital
reported the following conditions:
At Belchertown the buildings are old, crowded, sparsely furnished and
frequently cold. Repairs at times go unattended for months. On occasion,
the fire alarm system has been inoperative ....
.... Doors to residential buildings often cannot be opened due to the
age of the locking system.
At Belchertown there are continuing unnecessary shortages of sanitation
supplies, such as disinfectant, detergents and mops, directly resulting in the
daily spread of infection among the residents ....
.... Cockroaches have been chronic, ever present and in the recent
past, have overrun several buildings to the extent of crawling over immobile
patients ....
.... There is no semblance of privacy at Belchertown.
.... Punishment has bordered on cruel and abusive treatment.
.... Unnecessary and incorrect medication has been given to residents.
.... Prescribed medical care is delayed or ignored for long periods of
time. There are frequent shortages of medical supplies and drugs. In many
cases, recommended corrective orthopedic surgery, as well as the fitting of
eye-glasses and hearing aids has been delayed for several years. These delays
further reduced the resident's ability to function and in some cases delayed
discharge from the institution for years.48
Most recently, Dr. Philip Roos, Executive Director of the National Associa-
tion for Retarded Children, concluded his testimony in Wyatt v. Stickney with the
following summary:
... The conditions at Partlow today are generally dehumanizing, fostering
47 B. BLATT & F. KAPLAN, CHRISTMAS IN PURGATORY-A PHoToGRAPHIc ESSAY ON
MENTAL RETARDATION 22 (1966). In commenting on this book, Doctor Kugel has stated in
CHANGING PATTERNS, supra note 20, at 4:
Recently, Blatt and Kaplan (1967) published a book entitled Christmas in
Purgatory. In this book they indicated pictorially the deplorable state of some resi-
dential facilities. Although the authors were criticized by some, I believe that Blatt
and Kaplan have performed a great and important service by pointing up this shock-
ing problem. We all know of places where residents sit naked, surrounded by their
excreta. I have seen a man without legs condemned to walk on his stumps because
he once ran away from the institution, got lost, froze his legs and had to have them
amputated. Everyone was reluctant to provide him with rehabilitative services for
fear that there might be a repetition of this behavior, and, furthermore, his condition
was perceived as a deserved punishment!
48 Complaint for Plaintiff at 11-13, Ricci v. Greenblatt, Civil No. 72-469F (M.D. Mass.,
filed Feb. 7, 1972). The gist of Ricci is similar to that in Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781
(M.D. Ala.) formulation of minimum standards ordered, 334 F. Supp. 1341 (M.D. Ala.
1971), implementation of standards ordered, Civil No. 3195-N (M.D. Ala., Mar. 13, 1972),
because the plaintiffs are seeking a determination that they are constitutionally entitled to
adequate treatment.
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deviancy, generating self-fulfilling prophecy of parasitism and helplessness.
The conditions I would say are hazardous to psychological integrity, to
health, and in some cases even to life. The administration, the physical
plants, the programs, and the institution's articulation with the community
and with the consumers reflect destructive models of mental retardation.
They hark back to decades ago when the retarded were misperceived as
being sick, as being threats to society, or as being subhuman organisms. The
new concepts in the field of mental retardation are unfortunately not
reflected in Partlow as we see it today .... 49
At the hearing, defendants adopted the testimony of Dr. Roos in its entirety.
Other testimony at the hearing established atrocious incidents such as:
(a) a resident was scalded to death by hydrant water; (b) a resident was
restrained in a strait jacket for nine years in order to prevent hand and
finger sucking; (c) a resident was inappropriately confined in seclusion for
a period of years, and (d) a resident died from the insertion by another
resident of a running water hose into his rectum. 50
In commenting upon the foregoing, the order stated that "[e]ach of these in-
cidents could have been avoided had adequate staff and facilities been avail-
able."5 1
Experience through the years throughout the country has demonstrated that
reliance upon the legislature to provide solutions to the problems explicated in
the foregoing cases has been misplaced. As the court in Wyatt stated: "The result
of almost fifty years of legislative neglect has been catastrophic; atrocities occur
daily." 2
How then are the courts to enter the arena and secure for the retarded
humane living conditions and adequate treatment within the institutionalized
setting? Apparently by recognition of a constitutional right to treatment or,
more expansively, right to "habilitation" as developed in Wyatt. 3
B. Right to Treatment: Historical Development
The genesis of the concept of a legally enforceable right to treatment ap-
pears to be an article by Dr. Morton Birnbaum appearing in the American Bar
Association Journal. Doctor Birnbaum argued:
It is proposed in this article that the courts under their traditional
powers to protect the constitutional rights of our citizens begin to consider
the problem of whether or not a person who has been institutionalized solely
because he is sufficiently mentally ill to require institutionalization for care
and treatment actually does receive adequate medical treatment so that he
may regain his health, and therefore his liberty, as soon as possible; that
the courts do this by means of recognizing and enforcing the right to treat-
49 Wyatt v. Stickney, Civil No. 3195-N, at 4, n.7 (M.D. Ala., Mar. 13, 1972).
50 Id. at 8, n.13.
51 Id.
52 Id. at 8.
53 See text accompanying and following note 72 infra.
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ment; and, that the courts do this, independent of any action by any leg-
islature, as a necessary and overdue development of our present concept
of due process of law.54
In the same issue of the Journal, an editorial entitled, "A New Right," supported
the concept of a right to treatment:
A precedent which held that a patient in a public mental hospital has
the right to receive reasonable medical and psychiatric attention might work
wonders. It could be the dawn of a new day for thousands who upon re-
ceiving better attention would be released from a madhouse to lives of use-
fulness. A precedent can work wonders.55
Parenthetically, it should be noted that the authors who were advocating the
right to treatment were dealing with the situation of the mentally ill as contrasted
with the mentally retarded. While there are correlations between the two situa-
tions, there are also distinctions as will be hereinafter developed.
The first truly significant judicial development in the area of right to treat-
ment occurred in Rouse v. Cameron6 where a statutory right to treatment was
recognized by the District of Columbia Circuit by virtue of the 1964 Hospitaliza-
tion of the Mentally Ill Act. The court specifically determined that the act did
provide a right to treatment which could be judicially enforced. The statements
of the sponsor of the bill, Senator Ervin, played a significant role in the court's
determination. The Senator had stated, in part:
Several experts advanced the opinion that to deprive a person of liberty
on the basis that he is in need of treatment, without supplying the needed
treatment, is tantamount to a denial of due process. [The Senate Bill]
embodies provisions which will ameliorate this problem whereas existing law
makes no provisions for safeguarding this right.57
The court concluded, "[b]ecause we hold that the [statutory] right to treatment
provision applies to appellant we need not resolve the serious constitutional ques-
tions that Congress avoided by prescribing this right."58
In 1969, three years subsequent to Rouse, one author summarized the ele-
ments of the statutory right to treatment as developed by the District of Columbia
Circuit:
(1) The hospital need not show that the treatment will cure or improve him
but only that there is a bona fide effort to do so .... ; (2) The effort [must]
be to provide treatment which is adequate in light of present knowledge,
[though] the possibility of better treatment does not necessarily prove that
54 Birnbaum, The Right to Treatment, 46 A.B.A.J. 499, 503 (1960). See also Birnbaum,
Some Remarks on "The Right to Treatment," 23 ALA. L. REV. 623 (1971); Birnbaum &
Twersky, Observations on the Right to Treatment, 10 DuQuEsNE L. REv. 553 (1972).
55 Editorial, A New Right, 46 A.B.A.J. 516, 517 (1960).
56 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
57 Id. at 455; Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm.
on the judiciary Bill to Protect the Constitutional Rights of the Mentally Ill, 88th Cong., 1st
Sess., at 12 (1963).
58 373 F.2d at 455.
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the one provided is unsuitable or inadequate.... ; (3) adequate number of
psychiatric personnel; (4) initial and periodic inquiries [must be] made into
the needs and conditions of the patient with a view to providing suitable
treatment for him, and that the program provided is suited to his particular
needs. 59
The author concluded, however, that "[tlhese criteria, except for (3), are so
vague that only further judicial construction may clarify their meaning."''
Subsequent decisions of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia'
have further defined the right to treatment and expanded it by superimposing a
constitutional right to the "least restrictive alternative" upon the statutory right
to treatment. This concept of "least restrictive alternative" means, for ex-
ample, that a person who is mentally ill and in need of treatment, but not danger-
ous, could not be confined in a maximum security hospital for the criminally and
dangerously insane. 2 The rationale for this principle is that commitment "en-
tails an extraordinary deprivation of liberty" and that "such a drastic curtailment
of the rights of citizens must be narrowly, even grudgingly, construed in order to
avoid deprivations of liberty without due process of law."6
Support for the principle of the "least restrictive alternative" can be found
in Supreme Court decisions dealing with other areas of conflict between the state
and the individual, such as Shelton v. Tucker.6 4 The Court stated, in part:
In a series of decisions this Court has held that, even though the govern-
mental purpose be legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued
by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end
can be more narrowly achieved. The breath of legislative abridgement must
be viewed in the light of less drastic means of achieving the same basic
purpose.65
59 Katz, The Right to Treatment-An Enchanting Legal Fiction?, 36 U. Cm. L. REv.
755, 780 (1969).
60 Id. Parenthetically, one reason for hesitancy in positing the existence of a right to treat-
ment is the concern over judicial capability to enforce such a right in view of the contrariety
of views as to the appropriate standards for adequate treatment and the problems of administra-
tion and funding. See 80 Hv. L. R.v. 898 (1967); Note, Civil Restraint, Mental Illness,
and the Right to Treatment, 77 YALE L.J. 87 (1967). The rebuttal to this concern is found in
Tribby v. Cameron, 379 F.2d 104, 105 (D.C. Cir. 1967), where it was stated:
We do not suggest that the court should or can decide what particular treat-
ment this patient requires. The court's function here resembles ours when we review
agency action. We do not decide whether the agency has made the best decision, but
only make sure that it has made a permissible and reasonable decision in view of the
relevant information and within a broad range of discretion.
More recently, in effect replying to the Note in the Yale Law Journal, the Supreme judicial
Court of Massachusetts, in Nason v. Superintendent of Bridgewater State Hosp., 353 Mass. 604,
233 N.E.2d 908, 914 (1968) stated:
We do not attempt to prescribe (see Note 77 Yale L.J. 87, 107-114) what treat-
ment should be given to Nason. We hold as to this only that a program for Nason's
appropriate treatment is to be determined by competent doctors in their best judg-
ment within the limits of permissible medical practice . . . and is to be followed
diligently.
61 Lake v. Cameron, 364 F.2d 657 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Covington v. Harris, 419 F.2d 617(D.C. Cir. 1969).
62 Covington v. Harris, 419 r.2d 617, 622-25 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
63 Id. at 623.
64 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
65 Id. at 488.
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The development of the idea of a right to treatment continued with the
decision of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in Nason v. Superintendent
of Bridgewater State Hospital" where the court determined that confinement of
mentally ill persons "without affording them reasonable treatment also raises
serious questions of deprivation of liberty without due process of law." However,
the most explicit stand today on the principle that the right to treatment is con-
stitutionally mandated is found in Wyatt v. Stickney, where the court stated:
[Aldequate and effective treatment is constitutionally required because,
absent treatment, the hospital is transformed "into a penitentiary where
one could be held indefinitely for no convicted offense." Ragsdale v. Over-
holser, 108 U.S. App. D.C. 308, 281 F.2nd 943, 950 (1960). The purpose of
involuntary hospitalization for treatment purposes is treatment and not mere
custodial care or punishment. This is the only justification, from a con-
stitutional standpoint, that allows civil commitments to mental institu-
tions. .. .67
In the first Wyatt decision, which was rendered March 12, 1971, the court
retained jurisdiction and permitted the defendant 90 days to define the mission
and functions of Bryce Hospital (apparently the inmates represented a mix of
geriatric patients, mentally retarded patients and mentally ill patients) and
formulate a specific plan to assure that the patients would be provided adequate
treatment."8 In the second decision, rendered on December 10, 1971, the court
declared that the defendants had failed to formulate minimum medical and
constitutional standards for the operation of the institutions in question. Accord-
ingly, the court established a date for a formal hearing to permit both the parties
and the various amici to present proposed standards that would "meet medical
and constitutional requirements for the operation of three medical institutions
herein concerned ..."6
The decisions dealing with right to treatment prior to Wyatt have dealt with
persons who are mentally ill, as contrasted to those who are mentally retarded.
However, the third, and latest, decision in the Wyatt v. Stickney sequence dealt
with conditions at the Partlow State School and Hospital, Tuscaloosa, Alabama,
a public institution for the mentally retarded. After referring to the earlier de-
cisions dealing with the mentally ill, the court stated:
In the context of the right to appropriate care for people civilly confined to
public mental institutions, no viable distinction can be made between the
mentally ill and the mentally retarded. Because the only constitutional
justification for civilly committing a mental retardate, therefore, is habilita-
tion, it follows ineluctably that once committed such a person is possessed of
an inviolable constitutional right to habilitationY'
66 353 Mass. 604, 233 N.E.2d 908, 913 (1968).
67 Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781, 784 (M.D. Ala. 1971).
68 Id.
69 Wyatt v. Stickney, 334 F. Supp. 1341, 1344 (M.D. Ala. 1971).
70 Wyatt v. Stickney, Civil No. 3195-N at 4 (M.D. Ala., Apr. 13, 1972). The court quoted
from the Dec. 27, 1971, resolution of the General Assembly of the United Nations entitled
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0. Right to, Treatment in the Context of Mental Retardation
Submerged within the laudable ideals embodied in the foregoing statement
are two significant extensions in the development of the law in the area of right
to treatment. The first extension lies in the use of the term "habilitation" rather
than "treatment"; the second, in extending this right to a group which arguably,
in general, is not involuntarily, but rather "voluntarily," committed.
1. HA~mrrATioN: DEBINTON AND ScoP.
Judge Johnson's conclusion in Wyatt that a mental retardate has a constitu-
tional right to "habilitation," necessarily required him to confront the task of
defining the terms and enumerating those standards encompassed within the
constitutional minima. This task resulted in the adoption of a document entitled
"Minimum Constitutional Standards for Adequate Habilitation of the Mentally
Retarded,"'" which is included as an appendix to the court's decision. The court
defined habilitation as follows:
... the process by which the staff of the institution assists the resident to
acquire and maintain those life slills Which enable him to cope more ef-
fectively with the demands of his own person and of his environment and to
raise the level of his physical, mental, and social efficiency. Habilitation in-
cludes -but is not limited to programs of formal, structured education and
treatment.
72
Education is defined as "the process of formal training and instruction to facilitate
the intellectual and emotional development of residents,17 3 while treatment is
defined as "the prevention, amelioration and/or cure of a resident's physical
disabilities or illnesses."7 4
Whereas treatment had heretofore been phrased essentially in medical terms,
habilitation is defined so as to expressly extend to education. Whereas treatment,
overlaid with the principle of the "least restrictive means," could require transfer
from a maximum security institution to a general psychiatric institution, the
concept of habilitation-as further defined and extended in the appendix to the
Wyatt decision-encompasses the nature of the living conditions within an insti-
tution such that overcrowding and sanitation may be effectively brought before
a court, together with the questions as to whether each patient has an individual-
ized plan, is enjoying a humane physical and psychological environment, is
"Declaration on the Rights of the Mentally Retarded" in support of this statement. The resolu-
tion read as follows:
...The mentally retarded person has a right to proper medical care and physical
therapy and to such education, training, rehabilitation and guidance as will enable
him to develop his ability and maximum potential.
Id. at 4, n.6.
71 These standards are set forth in the Appendix to this article. The standards were formu-
lated from the "Standards for Residential Facilities for the Mentally Retarded," adopted May
5, 1971, by the Accreditation Council for Facilities for the Mentally Retarded of the Joint
Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals, Chicago, Illinois.
72 Wyatt v. Sticlney, Civil No. 3195-N, at 11-12 (M.D. Ala., Apr. 13, 1972).




receiving adequate medication, diet, and clothing, and is attended by adequate
staff, both in terms of quality and numbers. 5
Rather than summarizing the provisions of the standards set forth in the
appendix to the court's decision, such appendix is attached to this article in order
to permit the reader to appreciate for himself the breadth of the concept of
adequate habilitation. In order to put the need for judicial implementation to
such a concept into perspective one need only review the authorities earlier
referred to which set forth the gross inadequacies in the present treatment of the
mentally retarded."'
It can hardly be gainsaid that once a right to treatment is recognized, the
extension embodied in the concept of habilitation is a natural one, particularly
in the mental health area since the psychological and physical environment is
intimately a part of the treatment process. On the other hand, the extension of
the right to treatment from those mentally ill to those mentally retarded does raise
some conceptual legal problems which will now be examined.
2. SIGNIFICANCE OF VOLUNTARY ADMISSION
As noted above, the premise upon which the right to treatment is based is
that the state, for the well-being either of the patient or society, has withdrawn
the patient from society, thereby depriving him of his liberty, and placed him in an
institutional setting for treatment. The fourteenth amendment covers state action,
not private action, 7 so it is necessary that there be participation by the state in
such deprivation of liberty in order that a constitutional claim may be stated.
Such state involvement is not difficult to discover in the mental illness area since
substantial numbers of those mentally ill have been involuntarily committed to
public institutions via civil commitment proceedings. 8 While most state statutes
also provide for so-called "voluntary" admission procedures pursuant to which a
patient may also "voluntarily" leave, overhanging such "right to leave" is the
possibility of a civil commitment proceeding being commenced by the admin-
istrator in the event the patient determines to avail himself of the opportunity to
leave the institution.79 In fact, it has been argued in the mental illness area that
there is in fact no such thing as a voluntary commitment to a state mental
hospital.8 0
Conversely, in the mental retardation area, the overwhelming majority of
the patients are either children or those who were institutionalized while they
were children. The admission of these persons to institutions for the mentally
retarded is arguably voluntary since the substituted consent of the parent or
75 Id. at 12-14.
76 See text accompanying and following note 45 supra.
77 Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967); Black, The Supreme Court 1966 Term-
Foreword: "State Action," Equal Protection and California's Proposition 14, 81 HARV. L. REV.
69 (1967).
78 S. BRAKEL & R. RocK, supra note 42, at 17. In 1968, about 60 percent of admissions
were involuntary.
79 Id. at 22-25, 461, 471-72.
80 Gilboy & Schmidt, "Voluntary" Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill, 66 Nw. U. L. Rav.
429, 452 (1971).
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guardian was obtained when the person was admitted. The logical conclusion
from such an argument is that the presence of the retardate in the institution can
give rise to no constitutional right to treatment predicated upon deprivation of
liberty because the patient is free to leave at any time. The logic of such a
proposition, of course, ignores the fact that many of the retarded in institutions
are not capable of living outside a sheltered environment"' and that the right
to leave in this context is just as illusory as in the area of mental illness.
D. Legal Bases for Right to Treatment
The question then arises as to what legal responses may rebut the argument
that the right to treatment should not be extended to the mentally retarded, at
least those who are purportedly voluntary admittees. There appear to be several
possible approaches.
1. PARENS PATRIAE
One approach is to rely upon the doctrine of parens patriae.5? It may be
argued that once the state steps into the role of the parent and assumes custody
of the child, it is bound to furnish the child such care and treatment as is required
of the parents themselves. Indeed, there may well be a statutory requirement
that the state furnish adequate care and treatment.8 Failure to discharge such
duty whether imposed upon the state by statute or as part of the common law,
could result in the deprivation of the retarded child's liberty without due process
of law. Granted that this is not the usual type of situation at which the due
process clause is directed; it is normally applicable only when the state is acting
hostilely to the individual, and not in a paternal capacity. However, In re
Gault84 indicates that when the liberty of the child is at stake, the state may
not use the cloak of parens patriae to shield it from the standards imposed by
the fourteenth amendment and consequent judicial scrutiny.
But there is still a further problem in relying upon the doctrine of parens
patriae since this doctrine is normally applicable only when the state is acting in
81 This is not to suggest that all retarded should be institutionalized; quite the contrary.
As stated in Wyatt v. Stickney, Civil No. 3195-N, at 13, n.2 (M.D. Ala., Apr. 13, 1972), "it is
contemplated that no mildly retarded persons be residents of the institution." On the other
hand, the severely and profoundly retarded are not capable of being self-supporting. Even in
this situation, home care at least for the young child is favored. See R. ALLEN, supra note 16,
at 13-14. However, where a home environment is not available because the parents, for
physical, economic, psychological or less justifiable reasons, cannot or will not care for the
child-, the state must then be prepared to furnish the sheltered environment pursuant to its
responsibility under the doctrine of parens patriae.
82 For background on this legal concept see note 31 supra.
83 See, e.g., IND. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-1703, 22-1735 (1964).
22-1703. The purposes of this institution shall be to care for, support, train
and instruct feeble-minded children, the term "feeble-minded" to include idiotic,
epileptic and paralytic children.
* * *
22-1735. It shall be the duty of the trustees and the superintendent, as far as
the means provided will admit, to cause the pupils of said school to be so trained and
educated as to render them better fitted to support and care for themselves, and pro-
vide, as far as possible, for the physical, intellectual and moral improvement of said
pupils.
84 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 16-17, 26-27 (1966).
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lieu of the parent. In the mental retardation area, however, the state is often
acting for the parent; in other words, it could be argued that the state is making
available a facility, possibly in the exercise of its proprietary, as contrasted to
governmental powers,"5 for which service the parent pays a fee... If the state is
not obliged to provide such a service, there could be two consequences. An in-
crease in the standard of care provided by the institution would also increase the
costs. The state could then either raise the fee it charges to the parents or remove
itself from the business of providing to the mentally retarded institutional facilities
for the benefit of the parents. Neither of these results would be particularly
happy; fortunately, they are extremely unlikely."7
2. IMPOSSIBILITY OF A "VOLUNTARY" COMMITMENT
A better approach is to argue that there are no voluntary inmates in an in-
stitution for the mentally retarded. A priori, the retardate cannot consent to his
institutionalization. The question then becomes of what legal efficacy is the
substituted consent of the parent in determining the voluntariness, from the re-
tardate's standpoint, of his restraint. As noted earlier, there is often a conflict of
85 But see text accompanying note 104 infra as to the arguably governmental character of
the operation of such institutions.
86 See, e.g., IND. STAT. ANN. § 22-1726 (1964):
Any persons who wish to enter a child into said institution for treatment, training,
culture or improvement, and pay all the expenses and furnish attendant, may do so
under agreement, rules and regulations prescribed by the superintendent and approved
by the trustees. Under this section adults may be admitted under rules adopted by
the trustees, if their entire support and maintenance is provided for by some friend
or other person.
See also IND. STAT. ANN. § 22-1808 (1964). The general approach as to the allocation of cost
in caring for a retardate in an institution has been characterized as follows:
The general rule in the United States with respect to the ultimate obligation for
the payment of expenses for retardates residing in state institutions can be stated as
follows: either the state alone or the state together with the county of residence is
responsible for the care of the institutionalized mentally retarded, subject, in all but
three states to partial or complete reimbursement from the patient himself, his estate,
parents, spouse and/or children. Since almost 85 per cent of all first admissions are
under 20 years old, few ever marry, have children or have any opportunity to earn
money to pay for their own care. As a consequence, parents represent over 99 per
cent of all liable relatives actually contributing toward the cost of institutionalization.
Maximum legal monthly charges for liable relatives in 1966 ran the gamut from $525
in one institution in Rhode Island to lows of $5 in West Virginia, $16.34 in Minne-
sota and $20 in California. The median was $120. In all 47 states requiring payment
by the patient or responsible relatives this obligation is ameliorated by the "ability to
pay" doctrine, which bases the charge to the obligor upon what he can afford to pay.
Knudsen, Mental Retardation-Who Shall Pay the Bill for Resident Care in Public Institu-
tions?, 3 FAM. L. Q. 331, 333-34 (1969).
87 The possibility of the parents bearing the brunt of increased costs is rendered unlikely
by the "ability to pay" doctrine. Knudsen, Who Should Pay the Bill for Resident Care in
Public Institutions?, supra note 86. Knudsen argues that the Equal Protection Clause bars
any obligation to pay imposed on the parent. Id. at 340-43. This author concurs that parents
should not be obligated to pay and would hope that enlightened legislatures would relieve
parents of this financial burden. The underlying rationale is akin to that of casualty insurance.
Nobody expects their home to burn down; but it does happen and the resulting burden may be
catastrophic if borne by the family in question. So the risk is spread among the many to make
it more bearable. Similarly, no one anticipates a retarded child. An enlightened social policy
could also diffuse the financial burden in this situation, particularly in view of the emotional
burdens which the family must continue -to bear. Since there is no mortgagee to exert pressure
to carry private insurance, government should in effect act as the insurer.
As to the likelihood that a state could decline to furnish facilities for those of the
retarded who need an institutional setting, see text accompanying note 104 infra.
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interest between parent or child in situations involving the mentally retarded.
This is particularly true where institutionalization is involved. As one authority
has stated:
Our laws seems to operate on the premise that institutionalization is for
the benefit of the child; indeed many urge that institutionalization on
parental application should be made as easy as possible. Yet, it would seem
that a great many children are institutionalized less for their own benefit
than for the comfort of others. Because it is believed that the retafded-
including retarded children-do indeed have "rights," the author would be
inclined to differ with the Task Force on Law of the President's Panel on
Mental Retardation, and require judicial approval in any case in which
institutionalization is based not on the needs of the child but on the needs
of others, in order that appropriate resolution may be made of the perhaps
conflicting interests of the child and his family, and that use of alternatives
to residential care may be explored.88
In fact, the parents' decision to ask for institutionalization of the child may not
be a truly voluntary decision:
Indeed, it may well be that the parent's request for admission of a
retarded child may not be a truly voluntary decision by the parent where
his economic or physical and emotional resources have been exhausted and
there is insufficient supportive help in the community to aid him in-keeping
the retardate at home."
With respect to the question of the "voluntariness" of a retarded person's
presence in an institution, there is some recent case law support for the idea that
neither the parent nor the child is capable of consenting to a situation which may
not be in the best interests of the child."0
In Frazier v. Levi," the court considered an application filed by the mother
and guardian of the person and estate of a 34-year-old retardate which sought
an order authorizing an operation which would have rendered the retardate
sexually sterile. The girl was apparently promiscuous and already had two
children, both of whom were also mentally retarded, for whom she was not
capable of caring. The court denied the application due to the lack of statutory
authority for such action:
As a mentally incompetent person, the ward lacks the mental capacity
to consent to the operation or to oppose it. Her legal rights are to be care-
fully protected and must not be taken from her without due process of law
even though her natural mother and guardian feels that the operation would
benefit all.92
88 R. ALLEN, supra note 16, at 14.
89 Wyatt v. Stickney Amici Brief, supra note 18, at 35, n.9.
90 Frazier v. Levi, 440 S.W.2d 393 (Tex. App. 1969); Strunk v. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d 145(Ky. App. 1969). It is assumed that institutionalization in a situation which would generate
legal action seeking recognition of a right to treatment is an instance not in the best interest
of the child.
91 440 S.W.2d 393 (Tex. App. 1969).
92 Id. at 394.
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In another recent decision, Strunk v. Strunk,3 the Court of Appeals of
Kentucky, in a four-to-three decision, permitted the transplant of a kidney from
a mentally retarded 27-year-old individual to his "normal" 28-year-old brother.
The majority opinion assumed, and the dissent noted, that the family was not
privileged to authorize the removal of the kidney. However, the majority
determined that a chancery court does have sufficient inherent power to author-
ize the operation, based upon evidence that such operation would be in the best
interest of the incompetent. Testimony established that the two brothers had a
very close relationship and that the death of his brother would be a severe
psychological blow to the retardate.9 4
Removal of a kidney certainly is no more a serious threat to life and liberty
than are the deplorable conditions in many institutions. Accordingly, if parents
may not consent to a kidney operation, their consent to institutionalization in a
warehouse-type institution certainly should not operate to absolve the state from
providing minimal standards of habilitation for the retardate while institutional-
ized.
3. EQUAL PROTECTION
Another approach in securing the right to treatment in an institutionalized
setting for the mentally retarded is through the equal protection approach. That
equal protection considerations may be applicable in the right to treatment area
was recognized by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in Nason. The
court determined:
[I]f such treatment is not available on a reasonable, nondiscriminatory
basis, there is substantial risk that constitutional requirements of equal pro-
tection of the laws will not be satisfied. Differences in treatment may be
justified by differences in particular cases but should be reasonably related
to the varying circumstances. 95
The Supreme Court has already utilized the equal protection clause in the mental
health area to strike down an unreasonable classification. In Baxstrom V.
Herold," the Supreme Court considered a New York statute which permitted
civil commitment at the expiration of a penal sentence without the jury review
which is available in other types of civil commitment proceedings. In declaring
the statute unconstitutional, the Court noted:
The director contends that the State has created a reasonable classifica-
tion differentiating the civilly insane from the "criminally insane," which
he defines as those with dangerous or criminal propensities. Equal pro-
tection does not require that all persons be dealt with identically, but it
does require that a distinction made have some relevance to the purpose for"
which the classification is made.... Classification of mentally ill persons as
93 445 S.W.2d 145 (Ky. App. 1969).
94 Id.
95 Nason v. Superintendent of Bridgewater State Hospital, 353 Mass. 604, 233 N.E.2d 908
(1968).
96 383 U.S. 107 (1965).
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either insane or dangerously insane of course may be a reasonable distinc-
tion for purposes of determining the type of custodial or medical care to be
given, but it has no relevance whatever in the context of the opportunity to
show whether a person is mentally ill at all. For purposes of granting
judicial review before a jury of the question whether a person is mentally
ill and in need of institutionalization, there is no conceivable basis for dis-
tinguishing the commitment of a person who is nearing the end of a penal
term from all other civil commitments. 7
Similarly, when two individuals are residing in a state institution for the
mentally retarded, one of whom has been civilly committed" and the other
"voluntarily admitted,"" there is no reasonable basis upon which to grant one the
right of habilltation which, as previously stated, includes a humane physical and
psychological environment, education, and adequate medical care, and not
grant a comparable right of habilitation to the other individual. While each may
have differing medical or educational needs, both are entitled to an adequate
medical and psychological response to those needs. The method by which a
mentally retarded person is admitted to an institution has nothing to do with the
general need for treatment and decent living conditions while residing in such in-
stitution. Accordingly, if an institution has both voluntarily and involuntarily com-
mitted residents, due process will compel constitutional standards of habilitation
for the involuntarily committed retardate and equal protection will compel the
extension of the same standards to the voluntarily admitted or committed re-
tardate.
But what if there is a state institution with only voluntary admittees? In such
a situation we will need to look to other institutions for a basis of comparison to see
whether there is a reasonable basis for differing standards at the two institutions.
If there is another state institution for the mentally retarded who are involuntarily
committed, we again have available the argument set forth in the previous
paragraph.
If there is no state institution which numbers among its residents involun-
tarily committed retardates (which is quite unlikely), we will need to switch the
basis of comparison to institutions for the mentally ill which must constitutionally
provide habilitation because of the involuntary commitment procedure generally
involved. Here the equal protection argument is somewhat more tenuous because
of the substantial differences in needs, capabilities, and future prospects between
the mentally ill and the mentally retarded. Nonetheless, in neither case should
97 Id. at 111-12 (emphasis in original); see also Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972)
where the Court held in part that the Equal Protection Clause barred continued restraint of a
mentally retarded defendant who was incompetent to stand trial unless such confinement was
pursuant to proper civil procedures.
98 See, e.g., IND. STAT. ANN. § 9-3220 (1956), which provides with respect to a neglected
or delinquent child:
If it shall appear that any child concerning whom a petition has been filed is
mentally defective or mentally disordered, the court, before committing him to an in-
stitution, shall cause such child to be examined by two [2] qualified physicians and
on their written statement that such child is mentally defective or mentally disordered,
the court may commit such child to an appropriate institution authorized by law to
receive and care for any such child. The parent, guardian or custodian shall be given
due notice of any proceedings hereunder.
99 Assuming, however, that there is in reality such a concept as a voluntarily admitted
retardate. See text accompanying and following note 93 supra.
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the state be able to retain an individual in custody under conditions which affront
human dignity.
A better basis for comparison might be between state and private institu-
tions. If the state, under its police power to provide for the health and welfare
of its citizens, establishes minimum standards for private institutions,'" ° can it
logically argue that the state is entitled to provide any lesser standard in its own
institutions? 0'
A final possibility which should be considered is the effect of a determina,
tion by a state to remove itself from the business of providing facilities for volun-
tary admittees who are mentally retarded. While it is extremely remote that any
state might so decide, we still may inquire as to whether there is any remedy
available for the retarded in such a situation. Since all states have furnished such
facilities and it is clear that certain classifications of the retarded are not capable
of existing except in a sheltered environment, it could be argued that the state,
through its past practice, has recognized the critical need of certain classes of its
citizens for an institutionalized setting and that for a state to deprive the citizens
of such a setting would be a deprivation of their liberty pursuant to the fourteenth
amendment.0 2 In other words, we would have the anomalous situation that for
certain groups of citizens to enjoy their liberty (or more specifically, to enjoy life)
a certain deprivation of liberty in the usual sense is necessary because realistically
they can only function in a state supported and sheltered environment.
100 See, e.g., IND. STAT. ANN. § 22-5032(3) (1964); IND. AD. RULES AND REG. § 22-
5032-1 et seq. (1967).
101 This could be a two-edged sword: not only could it be argued that state institutions
must meet "private" hospital standards, but also the converse; that "private" hospitals must
meet the standards constitutionally mandated in state institutions. It has been recognized that
"private" hospitals are entwined with state action and this may be subject to equal protection
and due process strictures. Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital, 323 F.2d 959 (4th
Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 938 (1964); Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 385-86
(1967) ("Urban housing, like . . . hospitals, is effected with a public interest in the historic
and classical sense." See also Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 299 (1966): "Conduct that is
formally private may become so entwined with governmental policies or so impregnated with
a governmental character as to become subject to constitutional limitations placed upon state
action" ).
102 Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967), which held unconstitutional the California
Constitutional Amendment forbidding the state to enact "open occupancy" laws and repealing
those in existence, could be interpreted as holding that once the state has acted to create a
"right," it cannot in -the future withdraw such right from prospective beneficiaries. See Black,
The Supreme Court 1966 Term-Foreword: "State Action," Equal Protection and California's
Proposition 14, supra note 77, at 73.
However, this would egregiously overstate the Reitman holding. It is noteworthy, though,
that Professor Black, in discussing this case, indicated his preference for an expansive interpreta-
tion of "state action" and stated a position which is particularly relevant to the situation of the
retarded:
When a racial minority is struggling to escape drowning in the isolation and
squalor of slum-ghetto residence, everywhere across the country, I do not see why
the refusal to throw a life preserver does not amount to a denial of equal protection.
Id.
Later, in drawing an analogy to the extension of the commerce clause which reached its zenith
in Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942), he suggested that where equal protection is con-
cerned there can be "no principled stopping-place" less than this:
If one race is, identifiably as such, substantially worse off than others with respect
to anything with which law commonly deals, then "equal protection of the laws," is
not being extended to that race unless and until every prudent affirmative use of law is
being made toward remedying the inequality. Id. at 97.
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There is both statutory and case law support for this position. For example,
Indiana has recognized its obligation by statute:
There shall be established in this state a farm colony for the feeble-
minded. In the establishment of this institution, the general assembly
recognizes the duty of the state to provide care for such of its citizens as are
feeble-minded, and are therefore unable properly to care for themselves.103
Also there has been judicial recognition that the operation of mental hospitals
is a governmental function0 4 and that the state has no realistic option to discon-
tinue them:
The discontinuance of the State mental hospitals for those needing care
and unable to pay, and the discontinuance of the correctional schools would
seriously adversely affect the public interest and welfare of the State. If
the State ceased to perform such services, it is unlikely that private enter-
prise would step in to fill the need. 05
The same rationale holds true with respect to institutions for the mentally
retarded, perhaps with even more force. While institutionalization of a mentally
ill person is, hopefully in many situations, a short term arrangement for which the
affected individual could pay upon his return to a fully productive life, mental
retardation is not, strictly speaking, curable (though its effects can be ameliorated
and the level of functioning greatly improved) "' Accordingly, for many of the
more seriously retarded, institutionalization (though not necessarily in a ware-
housing arrangement)' 7 is a lifetime proposition. Under such circumstances,
where the capital investment is extremely high and the capability of the con-
sumer to pay is extremely restricted, it is inconceivable that private enterprise can
furnish the services.
IV. Financial Impact of Recognition of Rights
It should be obvious to the reader at this point that the concept of a consti-
tutional right to treatment or habilitation will be expensive. As a matter of fact,
to provide the present inadequate treatment is costing over $500 million dollars
a year and the cost to continue such treatment is expected to rise considerably."
103 IND. STAT. ANN. § 22-1801 (1964).
104 Employees of Dep't of P.H. & W. v. Department of P.H. & W., 452 F.2d 820, 827 (8th
Cir. 1971), cert. granted, 405 U.S. 1016 (1972).
105 Id. at 826.
106 See text accompanying notes 145-49 infra.
107 See note 120 infra.
108 In early 1967, we were spending at a rate of $600 million a year for about
200,000 institution residents. However, merely to maintain the standards and rate
of current institution services will require a rapid rise in institutional costs. By 1975,
we could be spending $2 billion a year on our institutions, and they could still be
most inadequate. That this is a strong possibility is underlined by the fact that some
public institutions with the highest per diem expenditures in this country are grossly
dehumanizing.
CMkNGING PATTERNS, supra note 20, at 145. While the expenditure of this sum of money may
appear substantial, in reality it is grossly inadequate:
About 200,000 adults and children currently reside in public institutions for the
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Unquestionably, however, the fact that recognition of a right may be ex-
pensive is no reason to deny the existence of that right. As the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia has stated, a need for additional funds ".... is no
reason for the court to refrain from declaring that the obligation exists.... .""'
Similarly, in Hoosier u. Evans,"' the court rejected an argument that a class of
alien children could be excluded from the public school system because of in-
adequate funds:
. . .fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution may be neither
denied nor abridged solely because their implementation requires the ex-
penditure of public funds. For such purposes, the Government must raise
the funds.""'
The Supreme Court itself, in Shapiro v. Thompson," where state minimum
residence requirements for welfare benefits were invalidated, has stated:
We recognize that a State has a valid interest in preserving the fiscal
integrity of its program. It may legitimately attempt to limit its expendi-
tures, whether for public assistance, public education, or any other program.
But a State may not accomplish such a purpose by invidious distinctions
between classes of its citizens. It could not, for example, reduce expenditures
for education by barring indigent children from its schools.1 3
It is naive to believe, however, that the question of cost will not be lurking in
the back of the minds of judges and legislators when the question of constitutional
retarded in this country, at a cost of about $500,000,000 a year in operating expense
alone. At first glance, this appears to be a great deal of money and, to the unknow-
ing laymen, is cause for comfort, i.e., the mentally retarded have finally received their
due. However, simple arithmetic tells us that $500,000,000 divided by 200,000
amounts to $2,500 a year, or about $48 per week or $7 per day. This is about one-
eighth the amount spent for a day's general hospital care. Four states spent less than
$4 per day in 1966. In some checking that I have done recently, I learned that in
our better zoos, the larger animals require a higher per capita expenditure.
The average per capita daily cost for maintaining a retarded resident in each of
the four institutions I described was, at that time, less than $7, in one case less than
$5. In contrast, The Seaside, a new regional center for the retarded, sponsored by
the Connecticut Department of Health and discussed in our aforementioned book,
Christmas in Purgatory, spent $12 daily for care and treatment of each resident.
Although it may be true that money corrupts, it may be equally true that its absence
is similarly corrupting.
Id. at 40-41.
109 Doe v. General Hospital of -the District of Columbia, 434 F.2d 427, 433 (D.C. Cir.
1970).
110 314 F. Supp. 316, 320 (D.V.I. 1970).
111 Id. at 320.
112 394 U.S. 618 (1969). Parenthetically, the court in Wyatt v. Stickney, Civil No. 3195-
N (M.D. Ala., Apr. 13, 1972) took a subtle approach to the question of funding. The decision
recited the fact that plaintiffs have moved for an injunction against the expenditure of state
funds for nonessential functions of the state until enough money is available to provide ade-
quately for the institutions in question and asked the court to order a sale of a portion of the
Mental Health Board's landholdings and other assets. The Decree stated that the Court
reserved the right to rule on plaintiffs' motion and that if "the Legislature fails to satisfy its
well-defined constitutional obligation and the Mental Health Board because of lack of funding
or any other legally insufficient reason, fails to implement fully the standards herein ordered, it
will be necessary for the Court to -take affirmative steps including appointing a master, to in-
sure that proper funding is realized and that adequate habilitation is available for the mentally
retarded of Alabama." Id. at 8. One might characterize this as the "velvet glove approach."
113 Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 633 (1969).
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minimum standards of habilitation is brought before them. Unquestionably, the
increase in quality will have an upward thrust on cost; however, at least from a
long-run standpoint, there is no reason why a reduction in quantity cannot have
a commensurate downward thrust on the overall cost of providing services for
the retarded." 4 "Even though fewer than five percent of the mentally retarded
in the United States reside in institutions, more money is spent to maintain them
than is spent for any of the public programs which serve the remaining 95
percent. ' "1
5
Probably the most telling argument for recognizing the rights of the retarded
is the following statement:
In fact, of every 30 retarded children, 25 with education, are capable of
achieving self-sufficiency in the sense of entering the ordinary labor market.
Another 4, with education, are also capable of achieving self-sufficiency,
though in employment in a sheltered environment. And one, with educa-
tion, is capable of achieving self-care. 16
No doubt, most people would be surprised by the foregoing statement. This is
primarily because "the general population (including lawyers) views all retarded
persons as being nearer the low end of the scale.""'
114 The pressures on institutions from a numerological standpoint is illustrated in the follow-
mng excerpt: More than 200,000 people, nearly half of whom are children, now live in over
150 public institutions for the mentally retarded in the United States. Another
20,000 retarded reside in approximately 500 known private facilities. Tens of thou-
sands more wait out their times in institutions for the mentally ill; nearly 10 percent
of all residents in public mental hospitals are retarded.
The number of institutionalized mentally retarded increases by over 3,000 every
year. Public institutions for the mentally retarded alone admitted an average of
over 15,000 every year between 1960 and 1967. Over half of these were under ten
years of age. An average of only 8,000 was released from public institutions each
year from 1960 to 1967, and approximately 3,000 died while institutionalized during
each of those years. Accurate statistics concerning trends in the numbers of retarded
residents in private institutions and in public facilities for the mentally ill are not
available. Estimating from the number of retarded people in these facilities, they
probably accommodate an additional 300 to 400 retarded each year over and above
the more than 3,000 who are annually added to the rolls of public facilities for the
retarded.
CHANGING PATTERNS, supra note 20, at 17.
115 Id. at 18.
116 Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of Their Motion to Convene a Three Judge Court,
at 6, Pennsylvania Ass'n. For Retard. Child. v. Commonwealth of Pa., 334 F. Supp. 1257(E.D. Pa. 1971). Also in Ta PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON MENTAL RETARDATION MR69
17 (1969) [hereinafter cited as MR69] the authors stated:
Perhaps the most overlooked resource of all in the mental retardation field is . . .
the retarded themselves. Some three-quarters of this nation's retarded people could
become self-supporting if given the right kind of training early enough. Another 10
to 15 percent could be partially self-supporting.
117 Haggerty, Kane and Udall, An Essay on the Legal Rights of the Mentally Retarded,
supra note 1, at 65. The authors, two of whom are members of the President's Committee on
Mental Retardation and the other who is a consultant thereto, support the aforesaid mentioned
statistics on the self-sufficiency capability of the mentally retarded:
The major point of differences in the levels of retardation is that while the
profoundly retarded may have to remain in institutions during their entire lives, the
others are educable to a surprising degree. The moderately retarded can be taught to
take care of themselves physically and can learn some manual skills. Though the
moderately retarded cannot master formal school work, the mildly retarded can
reach the sixth grade and can also learn to do and to hold simple jobs.
There is quite a difference, then, between the reality of a retarded person's
ability to learn and perform certain tasks and the general public's expectations.
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The solution, then, or part of the solution, to the rising costs of institutional-
ization " is to insure that education and training are available to those significant
numbers of the mentally retarded who are capable of being self-supporting or at
least of existing in an environment less oppressive (and costly) than the total
care custodial-type warehousing institutions so prevalent today."9  "Few re-
tardates need hospital treatment; all need education, employment, a satisfying
social and cultural environment, and, in the case of retardates who cannot live
with their own families, a home in which they can live as normal a life as
possible."120
The significance of education in reducing the overall cost of the care of the
retarded has been well recognized by Dr. Marvin A. Wirtz, Deputy Commissioner
118 Another facet to the solution of reducing the cost of retardation is to eliminate that
retardation which develops from environmental factors. The PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON
MENTAL RETARDATION, MR 71 5 (1971) has focused upon this problem:
It is no coincidence that in isolated rural areas and crowded city slums where
the incidence of mental retardation is abnormally high, there is also an unusually
high rate of malnutrition, illness, unsanitary conditions, inadequate housing, accidents,
lack of health, care and education, and pervading apathy of poverty.
The report continues:
Children of the poor are about ten times more likely to be retarded than children
of the middle and upper classes. If the children of all population groups had the
same rate of mental retardation as those of middle and upper class whites, the
prevalence of retardation would decrease by 80 per cent.
Id. at 27.
119 As Judge Johnson has stated in Wyatt v. Stickney, Civil No. 3195-N, at 13, n.2 (M.D.
Ala., Apr. 13, 1972), "it is contemplated that no mildly retarded persons be residents of the
institution." Yet 18 percent of the residents of institutions are either mildly or borderline
retarded, while another 22 percent are moderately retarded. Thus, 40 percent of our institu-
tional population could be more or less self-supporting (see the following table). Supra note
20, at 20.
Distribution of Residents According
to Level of Retardation
Number of




Mild " 25,024 13
Borderline 9,625 5
192,493 100
CHANGING PATTERNS, supra note 20, at 20; see also id. at 24, 27.
120 CHANOING PATTERNS, supra note 20, at 205. The author also discusses the various
residential alternatives to institutions and compares the costs in building and operating the large
multi-purpose institutions, which characterize the approach in the United States, with the
smaller, single purpose foster homes and small hostels upon which the emphasis is in Europe.
Moreover, the author concludes that the smaller facility, besides providing a more humane
environment, may also be cheaper from an overall standpoint. See also id. at 211-26.
A step in the right direction was taken by Indiana when it enacted a law entitled "An
act to initiate the development of demonstration community residential models for the men-
tally retarded." Pub. L. No. 237 (Feb. 17, 1972). The preamble to this act reads:
Whereas, The state of Indiana is striving to provide a most adequate system of
programming for the mentally retarded; and
Whereas, Placement of a mentally retarded individual by the department of mental
health in one of the state institutions is often not in the best interest of the individual
for potential growth;
Section 1 provides:
It is the intent of the state of Indiana to develop through leasing a variety of needed
community residential facilities for the mentally retarded. These facilities will relate
to the full range of community programs and resources.
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of the U.S. Office of the Education Division for the Disadvantaged and Handi-
capped, Department of Health, Education and Welfare who testified before the
Maryland Governor's Commission as to the amount of money which "would be
saved for the taxpayers in a community by educating a child as opposed to allow-
ing him to become a ward of the State."''m The savings are two-fold: First,
savings would result from the decrease in costs of educating a child for 12 years,
as opposed to supporting him in an institution for his life-time; second, "savings"
would result from his productivity in working in a sheltered workshop during his
adult life. Dr. Wirtz has estimated the total savings as approximating $178,000
for one individual.12 He concluded his testimony as follows:
This is the approach I have used for the "so-called" hard-headed -business-
man who wants to know why we are spending so much money on "these kids
when they aren't going to amount to anything anyway." To me, the answer
is very clear. This country can no longer afford to avoid its responsibilities
for educating the handicapped either in financial or moral terms.2 -
Consequently, in order that many of the retarded may obtain full or partial
self-sufficiency and that the long term pressure on the state's financial resources
may be reduced, it is necessary that educational and training programs generally
be made available to the retarded. This logically leads to the third question
raised in this article, namely, to what extent are the retarded constitutionally
entitled to an education within the public school system?
V. Education
There is no question that today substantial numbers of retarded children
are denied the right to an education. In 1969, the President's Committee on
Retardation estimated that approximately sixty percent of the school age children
who are retarded are not receiving an education. 4 An earlier study, which
dealt with all handicapped children and not just the mentally retarded, estimated
that seventy-five percent of these children were not receiving an education. 25
121 1966 REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION TO STUDY THE EDUCATIONAL NEEDS
OF HANDICAPPED CHILDREN IN MARYLAND 27 [hereinafter cited as 1966 MARYLAND REPORT].
122 Dr. Wirtz testified as follows:
Assuming that it costs $1,000 to educate a retarded child and he is kept in school
for twelve years, this would be an expenditure of $12,000 on the part of the taxpayers.
If, however, he entered a State institution at age 15 and stayed there until he was
sixty-five, he would have spent fifty years in an institution with an average cost of
$2,000 a year based on current spending. This would be an expenditure of $100,000
or a net difference of $88,000 in cost. Add to this the fact that if the person were
trained to work in a sheltered workshop and work for poverty wages for a period of
time that he finished school until he was sixty-five, which we might, assume is forty-
five years, he would have earned $90,000. If this is added to the $88,000 already
saved, there is a net saving of about $178,000 on one individual.
Id.
123 Id. at 28 (emphasis added).
124 MR 69, supra note 116, at 18.
125 1966 MARYLAND REPORT, supra note 121, at 3. The report stated:
Only about one-fourth of these six million handicapped children are registered in
special education programs in public or private schools throughout the country.
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While the situation is improving,'2 6 "more battles will have to be waged against a
system that still fails to educate its children.'
1 27
A. Equal Protection in the Educational Context
What legal weapons are available to insure that all children have the op-
portunity to receive a public education adapted to their particular needs? The
answer to this question lies in the application of the equal protection clause to
the present uneven and discriminatory availability of public educational programs
for the mentally retarded.
The basic principles governing the application of the equal protection clause
have already been discussed in the context of institutionalization.2 Such prin-
ciples have recently been reiterated by the Supreme Court:
In applying that clause, this Court has consistently recognized that the
fourteenth amendment does not deny to the States the power to treat dif-
ferent classes of persons in different ways.... The Equal protection Clause of
that amendment does, however, deny to States the power to legislate that
different treatment be accorded to persons placed by a statute in the dif-
ferent classes on the basis of criteria wholly unrelated to the objective of
that statute. A classification "must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must
rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation
to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced
shall be treated alike."2
The question under the equal protection clause, then, is whether a classification
which excludes some or all of the mentally retarded children in the public ed-
ucational system is a reasonable classification which rests upon some grounds hav-
ing a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation.
All states have established public systems of education which are generally
available-indeed, attendance is mandated-for all school-age children, absent
some basis for exclusion."'
Obviously, there is a difference in status between "mentally retarded" and
"normal" children-witness the fact that in discussing the education of the men-
tally retarded we are often talking about "special education" programs. But is this
difference so great that it will justify a state either to refuse to adopt special ed-
ucation programs for the benefit of the mentally retarded or, if it does adopt such
126 According to Weintraub, Recent Influences of Law on the Identification and Placement
of Children in Programs for the Mentally Retarded, 4 (unpublished manuscript on file at the
NoTRE DAME LAWYER):
By 1948, 1,500 school systems reported special education programs, 3,600 in
1958, and 5,600 in 1963. Mackie (1965) reported that as many as 8,000 school
districts contracted for special education services from neighboring districts. Today
it is estimated that 2,252,000 handicapped children are receiving special education
services, 600,000 of whom are considered mentally retarded. Of all handicapped
children receiving services . . . about 25% are black, Mexican, American, Puerto
Rican, or Indian.
127 Id.
128 See text accompanying note 94 supra.
129 Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75-76 (1971).
130 Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
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programs, limiting the scope of these programs so that certain classes of the
mentally retarded (the "severely and profoundly" retarded or the "trainable,"
for example) are excluded from participation in these programs? To answer this
question, it is necessary to look at the status of education as viewed through the
eyes of the courts and the capability of all the mentally retarded to benefit from
education as viewed through the eyes of the professionals in the field of mental
retardation.
1. EDUCATION AS A FUNDAMENTAL INTEREST
It is necessary to look at education generally, and its significance to the
child and society, because of the two-fold approach which the courts have taken
in determining whether a classification established by the legislature is reasonable.
Normally, a classification will be upheld if the legislation is not arbitrary and
fulfills a legitimate governmental purpose and is rationally related to that pur-
pose.'' On the other hand, "where fundamental rights and libertiesare asserted
under the equal protection clause, classifications which might invade or restrain
them must be closely scrutinized and carefully confined."' 32 In other words, a
more exacting standard of review of the reasonableness of the classification will
be applied when a fundamental interest is affected, and concomitantly, a
greater burden will be placed upon the state to justify such classification. More-
over, courts will closely scrutinize a classification where the interests of those who
are unable to effectively protect their interests are at stake.3 3
There is no question that the equal protection clause applies to eligibility
for public educational programs. "Such an opportunity, where the state has
undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on equal
terms."" "4 But is education such a fundamental interest that the strict standard
of review in determining whether a classification for excluding children from the
public school system is reasonable should be applied? Again, Brown is quite
forthright in its position on the fundamental nature of the availability of an ed-
ucation:
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and
local governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the great ex-
penditures for education both demonstrate our recognition of the im-
portance of education to our democratic society.13 5
More recently, the California Supreme Court has stated that "education is the
lifeline of both the individual and society." " 6 And the matter is perhaps most
131 Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968); see also Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348
U.S. 483, 489 (1955); Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457, 465-66 (1957); Ferguson v. Skrupa,
372 U.S. 726, 732 (1963).
132 Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966); see also Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969).
133 United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
134 Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
135 Id.
136 Serrano v. Priest, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601, 616, 487 P.2d 1241, 1256 (1971).
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aptly summarized by the district court in VanDusartz v. Hatfield:""
Where the onus of a legislative classification falls upon an interest which
is classified as "fundamental," the State bears the burden of demonstrating
a compelling interest of its own which is served by the challenged legislation
and which cannot be satisfied by any other convenient legal structure. That
approach fits this case because the interest at stake is education. The Ser-
rano opinion . .. has correctly inferred from relevant expressions of the
United States Supreme Court and from the nature of education itself that
this interest is truly fundamental in the constitutional sense.
1 38
2. Is EXCLUSION OF THE RETARDED REASONABLY CONSISTENT
WITH THE OBJECTIVES OF EDUCATION?
If it is accepted that education is a fundamental interest, with the correla-
tive requirement that the state must bear a substantial burden when it undertakes
to exclude a particular group from the public school system, is there anything in
the nature of the educational process which would justify a state in excluding the
mentally retarded from its system? The courts have recognized that education
is the principal instrument for the child "in helping him to adjust normally to
his environment" and that "it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be ex-
pected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education" ;... that
"education has become the sine qua non of useful existence" ;4' and that it has




Accordingly, is there any rational basis for not extending the benefits of
education to a retarded child? This question must necessarily be answered in the
negative because the retarded child has all the more need for an educational op-
portunity. The Maryland Governor's Commission eloquently stated the basis for
encompassing the retarded child within the public educational school system:
The basis for special education is founded in the belief that every child is
equally entitled to full recognition of his rights to an educational opportunity
consistent with his capacity to learn....
... The basic philosophical objectives must surely be the same for all
children: each individual should have the opportunity to become all that
he is capable of being, regardless of his economic level, sex, color, religion,
national origin, geographic location, or handicapping condition. His educa-
tion should equip him with the tools needed in life so that he can be of
greater value to himself and his community....
...Each child should be seen as a unique individual and should be
dealt with in terms of his own needs. The handicapped child has all the
basic needs of the non-handicapped child, as well as some exceptional needs
which must be served. He should have the benefit of an educational program
designed to suit his capacity and to develop him to the fullest possible extent
of his potential. 4
137 334 F. Supp. 870 (D. Minn. 1971).
138 Id. at 874-75.
139 Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
140 Manjares v. Newton, 49 Cal. Rptr. 805, 812, 411 P.2d 901, 908 (1966).
141 Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 483 (D. D.C. 1967).
142 1966 MARYLAND REPORT, supra note 121, at 4-6.
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More recently, the author of the brief in the Pennsyluania litigation has stated:
These purposes pertain with equal, even greater, force to retarded
citizens. Absent a structured, formal opportunity to secure an education,
the purpose will not likely be realized by retarded citizens at all; for them,
development and learning is unlikely to come informally or by happenstance,
as it does for so many others. And the consequences are considerably more
severe for retarded citizens. Absent education the retarded citizen will be
unable to provide for himself and may even be incapable of self-care and
hence in jeopardy of institutionalization, loss of liberty, and even loss of
life.143
But what of the arguments that particular groups of retarded children cannot
learn, that they cannot take advantage of the benefits of an education, and thus
should be excluded from the public school system. It is well known that many
of the public school systems which do have a special education program for the
mentally retarded nevertheless have provisions which exclude from the programs
those who cannot "benefit" therefrom.'" Such a proposition flies in the face of
current professional opinion. These "pessimistic views, which have been so
widely, and for so long, entertained regarding the ineducability of the mental
defective, are unwarranted."' 4 The Council for Exceptional Children now takes
the position:
There is no dividing line which excludes some children and includes others
in educational programs. Mentally retarded children of yesteryear who
were excluded because they were "unteachable" have recently become
"educable" or "trainable."'146
And the National Association for Retarded Children adheres to the following
position:
Public School education must be provided for all mentally retarded persons,
including the severely and profoundly retarded. There should be no dividing
line which excludes children from public education services. If current
143 Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of Their Motion to Convene a Three Judge Court at
4, Pennsylvania Ass'n. Retard. Children v. Commonwealth of Pa. (E.D. Pa. 1971). At the risk
of using a somewhat strained analogy, one of the most recent Supreme Court decisions in the
equal protection area also supports the argument that the mentally retarded should have equal
access to the public school system. In Eisenstadt v. Baird, 92 S. Ct. 1029, 1038 (1972) the
Court held that "whatever the rights of the individual to access to contraceptives may be, the
rights must be the same for the married and unmarried alike." If the equal protection clause
mandates that unmarried persons shall have the same access to contraceptives as married per-
sons, then surely the mentally retarded should have -the same access to public education as
normal children have.
144 1966 MARYLAND REPORT, supra note 121, at 3. See also MR 69, supra note 116, at 17-
18, where the authors stated:
A few states now require education programs for all children of school attendance
age. Most, however, effectively exclude many handicapped children by offering few
or no programs for 'them, while tens of thousands of retarded children, too mildly
affected to be assigned to traditional classes for the educable or trainable retarded,
stumble as best they can through regular classes. These drop out of school as soon
as they can, often to fall into the marginal-subsistence spawning grounds of chronic
welfare, health and social problems.
145 YATES, BEHAVIOR THERAPY 324 (1970); see also BAUMEISTER, supra note 2, at 181.
146 Editorial, 37 JOURNAL OF EXCEPTIONAL Cnimw N, 422, 429 (1971).
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educative technologies and facilities are inappropriate for the education of
some retarded persons, then these existing educational regimes should be
modified. 4 7
Judicial recognition that all children are educable and that all retarded
children, even those severely and profoundly retarded, should have access to the
benefits of the public school system, first appeared in Pennsylvania Association
,for Retarded Children v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,4 ' where the court, in
its order, injunction and consent agreement, set forth the following:
Expert testimony in this action indicates that all mentally retarded
persons are capable of benefiting from a program of education and training:
that the greatest number of retarded persons, given such education and
training, are capable of achieving self-sufficiency, and the remaining few,
with such education and training, are capable of achieving some degree of
self-care; that the earlier such education and training begins, the more
thoroughly and the more efficiently a mentally retarded person will benefit
from it; and, whether begun early or not, that a mentally retarded person can
benefit at any point in his life and development from a program of educa-
tion and training.
The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania has undertaken to provide a free
public education to all of its children between the ages of six and twenty-one
years, and, even more specifically, has undertaken to provide education and
training for all its exceptional children.
Having undertaken to provide a free public education to all of its
children, including its exceptional children, the Commonwealth of Penn-
sylvania may not deny any mentally retarded child access to a free public
program of education and training.
It is the Commonwealth's obligation to place each mentally retarded
child in a free, public program of education and training appropriate to the
child's capacity, within the context of a presumption that, among the alter-
native programs of education and training required by statute to be avail-
able, placement in a regular public school class is preferable to placement in
a special public school class and placement in a special public school class
is preferable to placement in any other type of program of education and
training.""'
Those who dispute the foregoing positions are not really arguing that a re-
tarded child cannot benefit from an educational experience, but are in effect
taking the position that the cost of providing such an experience is not balanced
by the benefits that accrue to the retarded child. Thus, for the sake of economy,
they would exclude certain retarded children from the benefits of the public edu-
cational system.
Such a position cannot be justified legally, economically, or morally. From
a legal standpoint, constitutional rights may not be abridged because implementa,-
147 Policy Statement on the Education of Mentally Retarded Children, adopted April 1971,
p. 2, NARC.
148 334 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
149 Id. at 1259-60; see also Mills v. Board of Education of District of Columbia, Civil No.
1939-71 (D.C. D.C. Aug. 1, 1972).
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tion requires expenditure of public funds.150 From an economic standpoint, the
cost of education is far less than the cost of institutionalization which may be the
result if education is slighted. 1 ' Finally, from a moral standpoint, the response is
a simple one: preservation of human dignity simply cannot be measured in
terms of dollars and cents. As President John F. Kennedy stated in 1961:




Of the three topics considered in this article, guardianship, institutionaliza-
tion, and education, the prospects for the retarded appear the brightest in the
area of education. Not only is there a federal constitutional basis for arguing that
the retarded are entitled to a public education, but also the same result is man-
dated by many of the state constitutions, which require the establishment of a pub-
lic educational system that is open to all."' Moreover, the requirement of upgrad-
ing the quality of habilitation in state institutions, and the concomitant cost spiral
resulting therefrom, will create tremendous pressures to provide services to the
retarded outside the traditional, huge warehouse-type institution. Finally, the
number of special educational programs and the awareness of the long-run
financial benefits flowing from such programs has been increasing.
But even in the area of education, one landmark decision, such as the Penn-
sylvania decision, is no absolute guarantee that the retarded throughout the
country will generally have made available to them their now-defined constitu-
tional rights. Legislatures and state and local boards of education across the
country will need to be educated-and possibly encouraged-with or without
further use of the judicial process. Judges Broderick, Adams, and Masterson
have shown forthrightness and sensitivity in their handling of the Pennsylvania
litigation; other courts may well need to step into the breach in other jurisdictions.
These jurists, and Judge Johnson of Alabama, have opened the courtroom door
to the advocates of the retarded and have awakened the American public to the.
plight of the retarded.'"
While it would be quixotic to expect the judiciary to right all wrongs, the
150 See text following note 94 supra; see also the Court's statement in Shapiro v. Thompsonr,
394 U.S. 618, 633 (1969) that a state "could not, for example, reduce expenditures for educa-
tion by barring indigent children from its schools."
151 See text accompanying and following note 114 supra.
152 Haggerty, Kane, & Udall, An Essay on the Legal Rights of the Mentally Retarded,
supra note 1, at 61.
153 See, e.g., IND. CONST., art 8, § 1, which provides in part that the Legislature shall pro-
vide "[flor a General and Uniform System of Common Schools, wherein tuition shall he without
charge, and equally open to all."
Similarly, Wis. CON., art. 10, § 3, provides that the Legislature shall establish district
schools and that "such schools shall be free and without charge for tuition to all children between
the ages of 4 and 20 years." It is of interest that in an early case, State v. Board of Education
169 Wis. 236. 172 N.W. 153 (1919) the Wisconsin courts permitted exclusion of a mentally
retarded child on the basis that "its presence therein is harmful to the best interest of the
school." However, in 1967, Wisconsin Attorney General La Follette reasoned that if a retarded
child is excluded from school, the obligation to provide him with a free public education
remains and some other means must be provided.
154 N.Y. Times, Oct. 9, 1971, at 23, col. 2; id., Mar. 26, 1972, at 14, col. 5.
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fact of the matter is that there will be increasingly frequent resort to the judiciary
to define and secure the retarded's legal rights. Matters, some of which at one
time were thought to be essentially within the province of the executive or leg-
islative spheres, have now been phrased so as to raise justiciable issues. In many
instances, the advocates of the retarded have become disenchanted with the com-
promising, delay, and lack of response they have discovered in working with the
executive and legislative branches of government.155
On the other hand, the judiciary has no such alternatives available to it. Ac-
cordingly, the advocates of the retarded are looking to the judiciary for forthright
recognition of the legal rights of the retarded. As Chief Justice Warren has
stated:
The Judge is not justified in parceling out a portion of the rights established
by a statute or the Constitution. It is his duty to afford plenary relief in ac-
cordance with the law as written. To do less or more would be a distortion
of the judicial process and violation of his oath. The judicial process, there-
fore, might well be described as "the process of principle" as distinguished
from "the art of the possible." 56
As litigation in this area continues to unfold, let us hope the judiciary continues
true to Justice Warren's charge.
APPENDIX*
Minimum Constitutional Standards for
Adequate Habilitation of the Mentally Retarded
I. Definitions
The terms used herein below are defined as follows:
a. "Institution"-Partlow State School and Hospital.
b. "Residents"-all persons who are now confined and all persons who may
in the future be confined at Partlow State School and Hospital.
155 The public so often fails to comprehend the distinction between the political process and
the judicial process. In the words of former Chief Justice Earl Warren:
mhey are so accustomed to witnessing trading, compromising, and postponing in
the political process that unthinkingly they attribute the same characteristics to thejudicial process. They fail to recognize that whenever the Congress discerns some
defect in our society, within its constitutional limits, it can reach out and bring the
matter before it for solution. If it cannot achieve consensus on the basis of a com-
plete solution, it may compromise for a half or quarter loaf or even postpone its
definitive action to a later day. That is why the political process is said to be "The
art of the possible."
Warren, Notre Dame Law School Civil Rights Lectures, 48 NoTRE DAmE LAWYER 14, 16
(1972).
156 Id. at 17.
* Wyatt v. Stickney, Civil No. 3195-N (M.D. Ala., Apr. 13, 1972).
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c. "Qualified Mental Retardation Professional"-
(1) a psychologist with a doctoral or master's degree from an accredited
program and with specialized training or one year's experience in
treating the mentally retarded; (2) a physician licensed to practice
in the State of Alabama, with specialized training or one year's ex-
perience in treating the mentally retarded; (3) an educator with a
master's degree in special education from an accredited program;
(4) a social worker with a master's degree from an accredited
program and with specialized training or one year's experience in
working with the mentally retarded; (5) a physical, vocational or
occupational therapist licensed to practice in the State of Alabama
who is a graduate of an accredited program in physical, vocational or
occupational therapy, with specialized training or one year's ex-
perience in treating the mentally retarded; (6) a registered nurse
with specialized training or one year of experience treating the
mentally retarded under the supervision of a Qualified Mental Re-
tardation Professional.
d. "Resident Care Worker"-an employee of the institution, other than a
Qualified Mental Retardation Professional, whose duties require regular
contact with or supervision of residents.
e. "Habilitation"-the process by which the staff of the institution assists
the resident to acquire and maintain those life skills which enable him
to cope more effectively with the demands of his own person and of his
environment and to raise the level of his physical, mental, and social
efficiency. Habilitation includes but is not limited to programs of formal
structured education and treatment.
f. "Education"-the process of formal training and instruction to facilitate
the intellectual and emotional development of residents.
g. "Treatment"-the prevention, amelioration and/or cure of a resident's
physical disabilities or illnesses.
h. "Guardian"-a general guardian of a resident, unless the general
guardian is missing, indifferent to the welfare of the resident or has an
interest adverse to the resident. In such a case, guardian shall be defined
as an individual appointed by an appropriate court on the motion of the
superintendent, such guardian not to be in the control or in the employ of
the Alabama Board of Mental Health.
i. "Express and Informed Consent"-the uncoerced decision of a resident
who has comprehension and can signify assent or dissent.
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II. Adequate Habilitation of Residents
1. Residents shall have a right to habilitation, including medical treatment,
education and care, suited to their needs, regardless of age, degree of
retardation or handicapping condition.
2. Each resident has a right to a habilitation program which will maximize
his human abilities and enhance his ability to cope with his environment.
The institution shall recognize that each resident, regardless of ability or
status, is entitled to develop and realize his fullest potential. The institu-
tion shall implement the principle of normalization so that each resident
may live as normally as possible.
3. a. No person shall be admitted to the institution unless a prior determina-
tion shall have been made' that residence in the institution is the least
restrictive habilitation setting feasible for that person.
b. No mentally retarded person shall be admitted to the institution if
services and programs in the community can afford adequate habilita-
tion to such person.
c. Residents shall have a right to the least restrictive conditions necessary
to achieve the purposes of habilitation. To this end, the institution
shall make every attempt to move residents from (1) more to less
structured living; (2) larger to smaller facilities; (3) larger to smaller
living units; (4) group to individual residence; (5) segregated from
the community to integrated into the community living; (6) de-
pendent to independent living.
4. No borderline or mildly mentally retarded person shall be a resident of the
institution. For purposes of this standard, a borderline retarded person
is defined as an individual who is functioning between one and two
standard deviations below the mean on a standardized intelligence test
such as the Stanford Binet Scale and on measures of adaptive behavior
such as the American Association on Mental Deficiency Adaptive Be-
havior Scale. A mildly retarded person is defined as an individual who
is functioning between two and three standard deviations below the
mean on a standardized intelligence test such as the Stanford Binet Scale
and on a measure of adaptive behavior such as the American Association
on Mental Deficiency Adaptive Behavior Scale.
5. Residents shall have a right to receive suitable educational services regard-
less of chronological age, degree of retardation or accompanying dis-
abilities or handicaps.
1 See Standard 7, infra.
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a. The institution shall formulate a written statement of educational
objectives that is consistent with the institution's mission as set forth
in Standard 2, supra, and the other standards proposed herein.
b. School-age residents shall be provided a full and suitable educational
program. Such educational programs shall meet the following mini-
mum standards:
Mild2  Moderate Severe/Profound
(1) Class Size 12 9 6
(2) Length of school
year (in months) 9-10 9-10 11-12
(3) Minimum length
of school day (in
hours) 6 6 6
6. Residents shall have a right to receive prompt and adequate medical
treatment for any physical ailments and for the prevention of any illness
or disability. Such medical treatment shall meet standards of medical
practice in the community.
III. Individualized Habilitation Plans
7. Prior to his admission to the institution, each resident shall have a com-
prehensive social, psychological, educational, and medical diagnosis and
evaluation by appropriate specialists to determine if admission is appro-
priate.
a. Unless such preadmission evaluation has been conducted within three
months prior to the admission, each resident shall have a new evalu-
ation at the institution to determine if admission is appropriate.
b. When undertaken at the institution, preadmission diagnosis and evalu-
ation shall be completed within five days.
8. Within 14 days of his admission to the institution, each resident shall
have an evaluation by appropriate specialists for programming purposes.
9. Each resident shall have an individualized habilitation plan formulated
by the institution. This plan shall be developed by appropriate Qualified
Mental Retardation Professionals and implemented as soon as possible
2 As is reflected in Standard 4, supra, it is contemplated that no mildly retarded persons
be residents of the institution. However, until those mildly retarded who are presently residents




but no later than 14 days after the resident's admission to the institution.
An interim program of habilitation, based on the preadmission evaluation
conducted pursuant to Standard 7, supra, shall commence promptly upon
the resident's admission. Each individualized habilitation plan shall
contain:
a. a statement of the nature of the specific limitations and specific needs
of the resident;
b. a description of intermediate and long-range habilitation goals with
a projected timetable for their attainment;
c. a statement of, and an explanation for, the plan of habilitation for
achieving these intermediate and long-range goals;
d. a statement of the least restrictive setting for habilitation necessary to
achieve the habilitation goals of the resident;
e. a specification of the professionals and other staff members who are
responsible for the particular resident's attaining these habilitation
goals;
f. criteria for release to less restrictive settings for habilitation, including
criteria for discharge and a projected date for discharge.
10. As part of his habilitation plan, each resident shall have an individual-
ized post-institutionalization plan. This plan shall be developed by a
Qualified Mental Retardation Professional who shall begin preparation
of such plan prior to the resident's admission to the institution and shall
complete such plan as soon as practicable. The guardian or next of kin
of the resident and the resident, if able to give informed consent, shall
be consulted in the development of such plan and shall be informed of
the content of such plan.
11. In the interests of continuity of care, one Qualified Mental Retardation
Professional shall be responsible for supervising the implementation of
the habilitation plan, integrating the various aspects of the habilitation
program, and recording the resident's progress as measured by objective
indicators. This Qualified Mental Retardation Professional shall also
be responsible for ensuring that the resident is released when appropriate
to a less restrictive habilitation setting.
12. The habilitation plan shall be continuously reviewed by the Qualified
Mental Retardation Professional responsible for supervising the im-
plementation of the plan and shall be modified if necessary. In addition,
six months after admission and at least annually thereafter, each resident
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shall receive a comprehensive psychological, social, educational and
medical diagnosis and evaluation, and his habilitation plan shall be
reviewed by an interdisciplinary team of no less than two Qualified
Mental Retardation Professionals and such resident care workers as are
directly involved in his habilitation and care.
13. In addition to habilitation for mental disorders, people confined at
mental health institutions also are entitled to and shall receive ap-
propriate treatment for physical illnesses such as tuberculosis.' In
providing medical care, the State Board of Mental Health shall take ad-
vantage of whatever community-based facilities are appropriate and
available and shall coordinate the resident's habilitation for mental
retardation with his medical treatment.
14. Complete records for each resident shall be maintained and shall be
readily available to Qualified Mental Retardation Professionals and to
the resident care workers who are directly involved with the particular
resident. All information contained in a resident's records shall be con-
sidered privileged and confidential. The guardian, next of kin, and
any person properly authorized in writing by the resident, if such resi-
dent is capable of giving informed consent, or by his guardian or next
of kin, shall be permitted access to the resident's records. These records
shall include:
a. Identification data, including the resident's legal status; b. The
resident's history, including but not limited to: (1) family data, ed-
ucational background, and employment record; (2) prior medical
history, both physical and mental, including prior institutionalization;
c. The resident's grievances if any; d. An inventory of the resident's
life skills; e. A record of each physical examination which describes
the results of the examination; L A copy of the individual habilita-
ton plan and any modifications thereto and an appropriate summary
which will guide and assist the resident care workers in implementing
the resident's program; g. The findings made in periodic reviews of
the habilitation plan (see Standard 12, supra), which findings shall
include an analysis of the successes and failures of the habilitation
program and shall direct whatever modifications are necessary; h. A
copy of the post-institutionalization plan and any modifications there-
to, and a summary of the steps that have been taken to implement
that plan; i. A medication history and status, pursuant to Standard
22, infra; j. A summary of each significant contact by a Qualified
Mental Retardation Professional with the resident; k. A summary
of the residents response to his program, prepared by a Qualified
Mental Retardation Professional involved in the resident's habilita-
3 Approximately 50 patients at Bryce-Searcy are tubercular as also are approximately
four residents at Partlow.
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tion and recorded at least monthly. Such response, wherever pos-
sible, shall be scientifically documented. 1. A monthly summary of
the extent and nature of the resident's work activities described in
the Standard 33(b), infra and the effect of such activity upon the
resident's progress along the habilitation plan; m. A signed order
by a Qualified Mental Retardation Professional for any physical
restraints, as provided in Standard 26 (a) (1), infra; n. A description
of any extraordinary incident or accident in the institution involving
the resident, to be entered by a staff member noting personal knowl-
edge of the incident or accident or other source of information, in-
cluding any reports of investigations of resident mistreatment, as
required by Standard 28, infra; o. A summary of family visits
and contacts; p. A summary of attendance and leaves from the
institution; q. A record of any seizures, illnesses, treatments thereof,
and immunizations.
IV. Humane Physical and Psychological Environment
15. Residents shall have a right to dignity, privacy and humane care.
16. Residents shall lose none of the rights enjoyed by citizens of Alabama
and of the United States solely by reason of their admission or commit-
ment to the institution, except as expressly determined by an appropriate
court.
17. No person shall be presumed mentally incompetent solely by reason of
his admission or commitment to the institution.
18. The opportunity for religions worship shall be accorded to each resident
who desires such worship. Provisions for religious worship shall be made
available to all residents on a nondiscriminatory basis. No individual
shall be coerced into engaging in any religious activities.
19. Residents shall have the same rights to telephone communication as
patients at Alabama public hospitals, except to the extent that a
Qualified Mental Retardation Professional responsible for formulation
of a particular resident's habilitation plan (see Standard 9, supra)
writes an order imposing special restrictions and explains the reasons for
any such restrictions. The written order must be renewed semiannually
if any restrictions are to be continued. Residents shall have an un-
restricted right to visitation, except to the extent that a Qualified Mental
Retardation Professional responsible for formulation of a particular
resident's habilitation plan (see Standard 9, supra) writes an order im-
posing special restrictions and explains the reasons for any such restric-
tions. The written order must be renewed semiannually if any restric-
tions are to be continued.
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20. Residents shall be entitled to send and receive sealed mail. Moreover,
it shall be the duty of the institution to facilitate the exercise of this right
by furnishing the necessary materials and assistance.
21. The institution shall provide, under appropriate supervision, suitable op-
portunities for the resident's interaction with members of the opposite
sex, except where a Qualified Mental Retardation Professional respon-
sible for the formulation of a particular resident's habilitation plan
writes an order to the contrary and explains the reasons therefor.
22. Medication:
a. No medication shall be administered unless at the written order of a
physician. b. Notation of each individual's medication shall be kept in
his medical records (Standard 14(i) supra). At least weekly the at-
tending physician shall review the drug regimen of each resident
under his care. All prescriptions shall be written with a termination
date, which shall not exceed 30 days. c. Residents shall have a right to
be free from unnecessary or excessive medication. The resident's records
shall state the effects of psychoactive medication on the resident. When
dosages of such are changed or other psychoactive medications are pre-
scribed, a notation shall be made in the resident's record concerning the
effect of the new medication or new dosages and the behavior changes,
if any, which occur. d. Medication shall not be used as punishment, for
the convenience of staff, as a substitute for a habilitation program, or in
quantities that interfere with the resident's habilitation program. e. Phar-
macy services at the institution shall be directed by a professionally
competent pharmacist licensed to practice in the State of Alabama.
Such pharmacist shall be a graduate of a school of pharmacy accredited
by the American Council on Pharmaceutical Education. Appropriate
officials of the institution, at their option, may hire such a pharmacist or
pharmacists fulltime or, in lieu thereof, contract with outside phar-
macists. f. Whether employed fulltime or on a contract basis, the phar-
macist shall perform duties which include but are not limited to the
following: (1) Receiving the original, or direct copy, of the physician's
drug treatment order; (2) Reviewing the drug regimen, and any
changes, for potentially adverse reactions, allergies, interactions, con-
traindications, rationality, and laboratory test modifications and advising
the physician of any recommended changes, with reasons and with an
alternate drug regimen; (3) Maintaining for each resident an individual
record of all medications (prescription and nonprescription) dispensed,
including quantities and frequency of refills; (4) Participating, as ap-
propriate, in the continuing interdisciplinary evaluation of individual
residents for the purposes of initiation, monitoring, and follow-up of
individualized habilitation programs. g. Only appropriately trained staff
shall be allowed to administer drugs.
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23. Seclusion, defined as the placement of a resident alone in a locked room,
shall not be employed. Legitimate "time out" procedures may be
utilized under close and direct professional supervision as a technique in
behavior-shaping programs.
24. Behavior modification programs involving the use of noxious or aversive
stimuli shall be reviewed and approved by the institution's Human
Rights Committee and shall be conducted only with the express and
informed consent of the affected resident, if the resident is able to give
such consent, and of his guardian or next of kin, after opportunities for
consultation with independent specialists and with legal counsel. Such
behavior modification programs shall be conducted only under the
supervision of and in the presence of a Qualified Mental Retardation
Professional who has had proper training in such techniques.
25. Electric shock devices shall be considered a research technique for the
purpose of these standards. Such devices shall only be used in extraor-
dinary circumstances to prevent self-mutilation leading to repeated
and possibly permanent physical damage to the resident and only after
alternative techniques have failed. The use of such devices shall be
subject to the conditions prescribed in Standard 24, supra, and Standard
29, infra, and shall be used only under the direct and specific order of
the superintendent.
26. Physical restraint shall be employed only when absolutely necessary to
protect the resident from injury to himself or to prevent injury to others.
Restraint shall not be employed as punishment, for the convenience of
staff, or as a substitute for a habilitation program. Restraint shall be
applied only if alternative techniques have failed and only if such
restraint imposes the least possible restriction consistent with its purpose.
a. Only Qualified Mental Retardation Professionals may authorize the
use of restraints. (1) Orders for restraints by the Qualified Mental Re-
tardation Professionals shall be in writing and shall not be in force for
longer than 12 hours. (2) A resident placed in restraint shall be checked
at least every 30 minutes by staff trained in the use of restraints, and a
record of such checks shall be kept. (3) Mechanical restraints shall be
designed and used so as not to cause physical injury to the resident and
so as to cause the least possible discomfort. (4) Opportunity for motion
and exercise shall be provided for a period of not less than ten minutes
during each two hours in which restraint is employed. (5) Daily reports
shall be made to the superintendent by those Qualified Mental Retarda-
tion Professionals ordering the use of restraints, summarizing all such
uses of restraint, the types used, the duration, and the reasons therefor.
b. The institution shall cause a written statement of this policy to be
posted in each living unit and circulated to all staff members.
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27. Corporal punishment shall not be permitted.
28. The institution shall prohibit mistreatment, neglect or abuse in any
form of any resident.
a. Alleged violations shall be reported immediately to the superintendent
and there shall be a written record that: (1) Each alleged violation has
been thoroughly investigated and findings stated; (2) The results of
such investigation are reported to the superintendent and to the com-
missioner within 24 hours of the report of the incident. Such reports
shall also be made to the institution's Human Rights Committee monthly
and to the Alabama Board of Mental Health at its next scheduled public
meeting. b. The institution shall cause a written statement of this policy
to be posted in each cottage and building and circulated to all staff
members.
29. Residents shall have a right not to be subjected to experimental research
without the express and informed consent of the resident, if the resident
is able to give such consent, and of his guardian or next of kin, after
opportunities for consultation with independent specialists and with legal
counsel. Such proposed research shall first have been reviewed and
approved by the institution's Human Rights Committee before such con-
sent shall be sought. Prior to such approval the institution's Human
Rights Committee shall determine that such research complies with the
principles of the Statement on the Use of Human Subjects for Research
of the American Association on Mental Deficiency and with the prin-
ciples for research involving human subjects required by the United
States Department of Health, Education and Welfare for projects sup-
ported by that agency.
30. Residents shall have a right not to be subjected to any unusual or
hazardous treatment procedures without the express and informed con-
sent of the resident, if the resident is able to give such consent, and of his
guardian or next of kin, after opportunities for consultation with inde-
pendent specialists and legal counsel. Such proposed procedures shall
first have been reviewed and approved by the institution's Human
Rights Committee before such consent shall be sought.
31. Residents shall have a right to regular physical exercise several times a
week. It shall be the duty of the institution to provide both indoor and
outdoor facilities and equipment for such exercise.




33. The following rules shall govern resident labor:
a. Institution Maintenance
(1) No resident shall be required to perform labor which involves
the operation and maintenance of the institution or for which the
institution is under contract with an outside organization. Privileges
or release from the institution shall not be conditioned upon the
performance of labor covered by this provision. Residents may
voluntarily engage in such labor if the labor is compensated in ac-
cordance with the minimum wage laws of the Fair Labor Standards
Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206 as amended, 1966. (2) No resident shall be
involved in the care (feeding, clothing, bathing), training, or super-
vision of other residents unless he: (a) has volunteered; (b) has been
specifically trained in the necessary skills; (c) has the humane judg-
ment required for such activities; (d) is adequately supervised; and
(e) is reimbursed in accordance with the minimum wage laws of the
Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206 as amended, 1966.
b. Training Tasks and Labor
(1) Residents may be required to perform vocational training tasks
which do not involve the operation and maintenance of the institu-
tion, subject to a presumption that an assignment of longer than
three months to any task is not a training task, provided the specific
task or any change in task assignment is: (a) An integrated part of
the resident's habilitation plan and approved as a habilitation activity
by a Qualified Mental Retardation Professional responsible for super-
vising the resident's habilitation; (b) supervised by a staff member
to oversee the habilitation aspects of the activity. (2) Residents may
voluntarily engage in habilitative labor at nonprogram hours for
which the institution would otherwise have to pay an employee,
provided the specific labor or any change in labor is: (a) An inte-
grated part of the resident's habilitation plan and approved as a
habilitation activity by a Qualified Mental Retardation Professional
responsible for supervising the resident's habilitation; (b) Supervised
by a staff member to oversee the habilitation aspects of the activity;
and (c) Compensated in accordance with the minimum wage laws of
the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206 as amended, 1966.
c. Personal Housekeeping Residents may be required to perform tasks
of a personal housekeeping nature such as the making of one's own
bed.
d. Payment to residents pursuant to this paragraph shall not be applied
to the costs of institutionalization.
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e. Staffing shall be sufficient so that the institution is not dependent
upon the use of residents or volunteers for the care, maintenance or
habilitation of other residents or for income-producing services. The
institution shall formulate a written policy to protect the residents
from exploitation when they are engaged in productive work.
34. A nourishing, well-balanced diet shall be provided each resident.
a. The diet for residents shall provide at a minimum the Recommended
Daily Dietary Allowance as developed by the National Academy of
Sciences. Menus shall be satisfying and shall provide the Recommended
Daily Dietary Allowances. In developing such menus, the institution
shall utilize the Moderate Cost Food Plan of the United States Depart-
ment of Agriculture. The institution shall not spend less per patient
for raw food, including the value of donated food, than the most recent
per person costs of the Moderate Cost Food Plan for the Southern
Region of the United States, as compiled by the United States Depart-
ment of Agriculture, for appropriate groupings of residents, discounted
for any savings which might result from institutional procurement of
such food. b. Provisions shall be made for special therapeutic diets and
for substitutes at the request of the resident, or his guardian or next of
kin, in accordance with the religious requirements of any resident's
faith. c. Denial of a nutritionally adequate diet shall not be used as
punishment. d. Residents, except for the non-mobile, shall eat or be fed
in dining rooms.
35. Each resident shall have an adequate allowance of neat, clean, suitably
fitting and seasonable clothing.
a. Each resident shall have his own clothing, which is properly and in-
conspicuously marked with his name, and he shall be kept dressed in this
clothing. The institution has an obligation to supply an adequate allow-
ance of clothing to any residents who do not have suitable clothing of
their own. Residents shall have the opportunity to select from various
types of neat, clean, and seasonable clothing. Such clothing shall be
considered the resident's throughout his stay in the institution. b. Cloth-
ing both in amount and type shall make it possible for residents to go
out of doors in inclement weather, to go for trips or visits appropriately
dressed, and to make a normal appearance in the community. c. Non-
ambulatory residents shall be dressed daily in their own clothing, in-
cluding shoes, unless contraindicated in written medical orders. d. Wash-
able clothing shall be designed for multiple handicapped residents being
trained in self-help skills, in accordance with individual needs. e. Cloth-
ing for incontinent residents shall be designed to foster comfortable
sitting, crawling and/or walking, and toilet training. f. A current in-
ventory shall be kept of each resident's personal and clothing items.
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g. The institution shall make provision for the adequate and regular
laundering of the residents' clothing.
36. Each resident shall have the right to keep and use his own personal
possessions except insofar as such clothes or personal possessions may be
determined to be dangerous, either to himself or to others, by a Qualified
Mental Retardation Professional.
37. a. Each resident shall be assisted in learning normal grooming practices
with individual toilet articles, including soap and toothpaste, that are
available to each resident. b. Teeth shall be brushed daily with an
effective dentifrice. Individual brushes shall be properly marked, used,
and stored. c. Each resident shall have a shower or tub bath at least
daily, unless medically contraindicated. d. Residents shall be regularly
scheduled for hair cutting and styling, in an individualized manner, by
trained personnel. e. For residents who require such assistance, cutting
of toenails and fingernails shall be scheduled at regular intervals.
38. Physical Facilities A resident has a right to a humane physical environ-
ment within the institutional facilities. These facilities shall be designed
to make a positive contribution to the efficient attainment of the habilita-
tion goals of the institution.
a. Resident Unit All ambulatory residents shall sleep in single rooms or
in multi-resident rooms of no more than six persons. The number of
nonambulatory residents in a multi-resident room shall not exceed ten
persons. There shall be allocated a minimum of 80 square feet of floor
space per resident in a multi-resident room. Screens or curtains shall
be provided to ensure privacy. Single rooms shall have a minimum of
100 square feet of floor space. Each resident shall be furnished with
a comfortable bed with adequate changes of linen, a closet or locker for
his personal belongings, and appropriate furniture such as a chair and
a bedside table, unless contraindicated by a Qualified Mental Retarda-
tion Professional who shall state the reason for any such restriction. b.
Toilets and Lavatories There shall be one toilet and one lavatory for each
six residents. A lavatory shall be provided with each toilet facility. The
toilets shall be installed in separate stalls for ambulatory residents, or in
curtained areas for nonambulatory residents, to ensure privacy, shall
be clean and free of odor, and shall be equipped with appropriate safety
devices for the physically handicapped. Soap and towels and/or drying
mechanisms shall be available in each lavatory. Toilet paper shall be
available in each toilet facility. c. Showers There shall be one tub or
shower for each eight residents. If a central bathing area is provided,
each tub or shower shall be divided by curtains to ensure privacy.
Showers and tubs shall be equipped with adequate safety accessories.
d. Day Room The minimum day room area shall be 40 square feet per
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resident. Day rooms shall be attractive and adequately furnished with
reading lamps, tables, chairs, television, radio and other recreational
facilities. They shall be conveniently located to residents' bedrooms and
shall have outside windows. There shall be at least one day room area
on each bedroom floor in a multi-story facility. Areas used for corridor
traffic shall not be counted as day room space; nor shall a chapel with
fixed pews be counted as a day room area. e. Dining Facilities The
minimum dining room area shall be ten square feet per resident. The
dining room shall be separate from the kitchen and shall be furnished
with comfortable chairs and tables with hard, washable surfaces.
f. Linen Servicing and Handling The institution shall provide adequate
facilities and equipment for the expeditious handling of clean and soiled
bedding and other linen. There must be frequent changes of bedding
and other linen, but in any event no less than every seven days, to
assure sanitation and resident comfort. After soiling by an incontinent
resident, bedding and linen must be immediately changed and removed
from the living unit. Soiled linen and laundry shall be removed from
the living unit daily. g. Housekeeping Regular housekeeping and
maintenance procedures which will ensure that the institution is main-
tained in a safe, clean, and attractive condition shall be developed and
implemented. h. Nonambulatory Residents There must be special
facilities for nonambulatory residents to assure their safety and comfort,
including special fittings on toilets and wheelchairs. Appropriate pro-
vision shall be made to permit nonambulatory residents to communicate
their needs to staff. i. Physical Plant (1) Pursuant to an established
routine maintenance and repair program, the physical plant shall be
kept in a continuous state of good repair and operation so as to ensure
the health, comfort, safety and well-being of the residents and so as not
to impede in any manner the habilitation programs of the residents.
(2) Adequate heating, air conditioning and ventilation systems and
equipment shall be afforded to maintain temperatures and air changes
which are required for the comfort of residents at all times. Ventilation
systems shall be adequate to remove steam and offensive odors or to
mask such odors. The temperature in the institution shall not exceed
83'F nor fall below 680F. (3) Thermostatically controlled hot water
shall be provided in adequate quantities and maintained at the required
temperature for resident use (11 0F at the fixture) and for mechanical
dishwashing and laundry use (180'F at the equipment). Thermo-
statically controlled hot water valves shall be equipped with a double
valve system that provides both auditory and visual signals of valve
failures. (4) Adequate refuse facilities shall be provided so that solid
waste, rubbish and other refuse will be collected and disposed of in a
manner which will prohibit transmission of disease and not create a
nuisance or fire hazard or provide a breeding place for rodents and
insects. (5) The physical facilities must meet all fire and safety stan-
dards established by the state and locality. In addition, the institution
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shall meet such provisions of the Life Safety Code of the National Fire
Protection Association (21st edition, 1967) as are applicable to it.
V. Qualified Staff in Numbers Sufficient to Provide Adequate Habilitation
39. Each Qualified Mental Retardation Professional and each physician
shall meet all licensing and certification requirements promulgated by
the State of Alabama for persons engaged in private practice of the
same profession elsewhere in Alabama. Other staff members shall meet
the same licensing and certification requirements as persons who engage
in private practice of their specialty elsewhere in Alabama. a. All
resident care workers who have not had prior clinical experience in a
mental retardation institution shall have suitable orientation training.
b. Staff members on all levels shall have suitable, regularly scheduled
in-service training.
40. Each resident care worker shall be under the direct professional super-
vision of a Qualified Mental Retardation Professional.
41. Staffing Ratios
a. Qualified staff in numbers sufficient to administer adequate habilita-
tion shall be provided. Such staffing shall include but not be limited to
the following fulltime professional and special services. Qualified Mental
Retardation Professionals trained in particular disciplines may in ap-
propriate situations perform services or functions traditionally performed
by members of other disciplines. Substantial changes in staff deploy-
ment may be made with the prior approval of this Court upon a clear
and convincing demonstration that the proposed deviation from this
staffing structure would enhance the habilitation of the residents. Pro-
fessional staff shall possess the qualifications of Qualified Mental Re-
tardation Professionals as defined herein unless expressly stated
otherwise.
Mild4  Mod- Severe!
erate Profound
b. Unit 60 60 60
(1) Psychologists 1:60 1:60 1:60
(2) Social Workers 1:60 1:60 1:60
(3) Special Educators (shall 1:15 1:10 1:30
include an equal number
of master's degree and
bachelor's degree holders
in special education)
(4) Vocational Therapists 1:60 1:60
4 See n. 2, supra.
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(5) Recreational Therapists 1:60 1:60 1:60
(shall be master's degree
graduates from an accredit-
ed program)
(6) Occupational Therapists .-.-......... 1:60
(7) Registered Nurses 1:60 1:60 1:12
(8) Resident Care Workers 1:2.5 1:1.25 1:1
The following professional staff shall be fulltime employees of the
institution who shall not be assigned to a single unit but who shall
be available to meet the needs of any resident of the institution:
Physicians 1:200
Physical Therapists 1:100
Speech & Hearing Therapists 1:100
Dentists5  1:200
Social Workers (shall be principally involved 1:80
in the placement of residents in the community
and shall include bachelor's degree graduates
from an accredited program in social work)
Chaplains6  1:200
c. Qualified medical specialists of recognized professional ability shall
be available for specialized care and consultation. Such specialist
services shall include a psychiatrist on a one-day per week basis, a
physiatrist on a two-day per week basis, and any other medical or
health-related speciality available in the community.
VI. Miscellaneous
42. The guardian or next of kin of each resident shall promptly, upon
resident's admission, receive a written copy of all the above standards
for adequate habilitation. Each resident, if the resident is able to
comprehend, shall promptly upon his admission be orally informed in
clear language of the above standards and, where appropriate, be
provided with a written copy.
43. The superintendent shall report in writing to the next of kin or guardian
of the resident at least every six months on the residents educational,
vocational and living skills progress and medical condition. Such report
5 Defendants may, in lieu of employing fulltime dentists, contract outside the institution
for dental care. In this event the dental services provided the residents must include (a) com-
plete dental examinations and appropriate corrective dental work for each resident each six
months and (b) a dentist on call 24 hours per day for emergency work.
6 Defendants may, in lieu of employing fulltime chaplains, recruit, upon the ratio shown
above, interfaith volunteer chaplains.
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shall also state any appropriate habilitation program which has not been
afforded to the resident because of inadequate habilitation resources.
44. a. No resident shall be subjected to a behavior modification program
designed to eliminate a particular pattern of behavior without prior
certification by a physician that he has examined the resident in regard
to behavior to be extinguished and finds that such behavior is not caused
by a physical condition which could be corrected by appropriate medical
procedures. b. No resident shall be subjected to a behavior modification
program which attempts to extinguish socially appropriate behavior
or to develop new behavior patterns when such behavior modifications
serve only institutional convenience.
45. No resident shall have any of his organs removed for the purpose of
transplantation without compliance with the procedures set forth in
Standard 30, supra, and after a court hearing on such transplantation
in which the resident is represented by a guardian ad litem. This
standard shall apply to any other surgical procedure which is under-
taken for reasons other than therapeutic benefit to the resident.
46. Within 90 days of the date of this order, each resident of the institution
shall be evaluated as to his mental, emotional, social, and physical con-
dition. Such evaluation or reevaluation shall be conducted by an inter-
disciplinary team of Qualified Mental Retardation Professionals who
shall use professionally recognized tests and examination procedures.
Each resident's guardian, next of kin or legal representative shall be
contacted and his readiness to make provisions for the resident's care
in the community shall be ascertained. Each resident shall be returned
to his family, if adequately habilitated, or assigned to the least restrictive
habilitation setting.
47. Each resident discharged to the community shall have a program of
transitional habilitation assistance.
48. The institution shall continue to suspend any new admissions of residents
until all of the above standards of adequate habilitation have been met.
49. No person shall be admitted to any publicly supported residential institu-
tion caring for mentally retarded persons unless such institution meets
the above standards.
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